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Abstract: 
 
The Risk Based Inspection (RBI) method prioritizes the process equipment, by calculating separate 
likelihood and consequence values for each piece of equipment. The combination of likelihood and 
consequence can be evaluated in a variety of ways to indicate critical equipment for action. Using 
the tools of Risk Based Inspection, it has been confirmed that equipment can be operated safely for 
a period of time, if inspections closely monitor the condition to eliminate uncertainties inherent in 
predicting the damage rates such as corrosion and erosion. The developing RBI tools for the Oil and 
Gas industries show promise as being effective and practical for decision making regarding 
equipment inspection (Conley and Reynolds, 1997). A Risk-based inspection approach helps in 
designing an alternative strategy to minimize the risk resulting from failures. Adapting a risk-based 
maintenance strategy is essential in developing cost-effective maintenance policies (Bertolini et al., 
2009) 
 
On the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS), some of the production and process facilities are 
reaching to the end of their design life and need of inspection activities is more critical. Stricter 
environmental and safety regulations and barriers coupled with increasing emphasis on cost 
reductions have been forcing the industry to use development inspection techniques and materials 
(Santos and Hajri, 2000). These returns to the questions: how much is the inspection coverage?  
 
In this study, the Technical Condition (TC) of a sub-system in a production and process facility is 
evaluated based on findings and historical data. Wall thicknesses of piping components inherently 
decrease due to degradation mechanisms such as corrosion and erosion. The minimum wall 
thickness is defined based on the standards and regulations. Based on the TC, reports are made for 
future inspection purposes as well as to present to the asset owner (Operator Company).  The report 
recommends number of inspection that has to be carried out annually based on The TC.   
 
Based on the remaining design life of the process facility, finding rate, criticality of the system, 
materials specification changes, degradation rate, unexpected degradation behaviours and the 
experience of the inspection planners, the thesis suggests an empirical model for inspection 
coverage by using risk based inspection strategy and previous inspection data to be used on an aged 
platform. The thesis also discusses about developing an inspection model as well as validating it 
based on past inspection data (Santos and Hajri, 2000). 
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Abbreviation: 
PL Process Hydrocarbons - Liquid WJ Jet Water DP Control Surface 
PT Process Hydrocarbons - Two Phase BD Blow Down 
 
PV 
Preventive 
Maintenance 
Program Based 
Maintenance 
PV Process Hydrocarbons - Vapours VF Vent to Flare HVIR 
Eddy current 
control 
LP Local control panel OH Oil Hydraulic I.A. Not applicable 
PCDA Process control & data acquisition OF Oil Fuel KUI 
Corrosion Under 
Insulation 
PSV Pressure safety valves. C Chemicals CM 
corrective 
maintenance / 
Needs Based 
Maintenance 
EHV Emergency hand valves. HM Heating Medium LCI 
Life Cycle 
Information 
PW Produced Water AI Air Instrument LTP 
Long-term  (for 
containers and 
pipes Framework 
RBI analysis) 
GR Gas Re-injection KM Kill Mud MIC microbial induced corrosion 
WF Water Fire SW Sea Water MPI Magnetic Particle Inspection 
FG Fuel Gas GVI General visual inspection NDT 
Non destructive 
testing 
RBI Risk Based Inspection PoD Probability of detection NVI 
Near visual 
inspection 
RL Remaining life time RKT Radiographic control SIP 
structure 
inspection program 
Statoil 
CSSLC 
Company Structured 
Surface Long-Term 
Care Concept 
RIS Pipe inspection program Statoil SRB 
Sulphate-reducing 
bacteria 
IOW Integrity operating window TC Technical Condition  ESV 
Emergency 
shutdown valve 
 SSV Surface safety valve     
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and scope 
 
Owners and users of Oil and Gas plant have the option to manage the integrity of their plant and 
plan inspection from assessments of the risks of failure. They need to be able to demonstrate that 
the risk assessment and inspection planning processes are being implemented in an effective and 
appropriate manner (Wintle et al., 2001). The aim of this report is to identify inspection coverage by 
using the inspection activities data for aged platform Statfjord B. In order to do this research these 
steps are followed: 
 
1. Study of  risk based inspection and RBI reports of Statfjord B 
2.  Revise the systems, sub-system of the platform in terms of process, inspection and RBI and 
select two main critical sub-system 
3. Observations and formation of the topic 
4. Gathering  inspection data  and analysis the inspection data to identify finding rate and 
coverage rate 
5. Identify  factors which are affected the inspection coverage 
6. Develop empirical formula based on the factors and inspection engineer experiences 
7. Validate the formula by the previous inspection data 
1.2 Main themes (Collection of Data) 
 
By using risk based inspection (RBI) philosophy, it is possible to calculate the inspection coverage. 
The main data that are used in this study are as below: 
 Drawings (PFD, P&ID) 
 Historical inspection data from Client data base RIS 
 Inspection summery including: total number of locations in each equipment group, total 
number of locations which are inspected, material, type of inspection, corrosion rate, 
minimum wall thickness, Technical condition etc 
 RBI report including: PoF and CoF for each equipment group, inspection interval, 
remaining life time and risk criteria 
1.3 Reflection of collecting data 
 
The inspection plan is structured by equipment groups. Equipment groups are defined for the main 
process and utility systems. The various equipment groups (sub-systems) are sorted into categories. 
In this study, the RBI reports from an aging platform for two main subsystems are discussed; Flow 
lines and production lines. Corrosion is seen as one of the significant challenges for the assets, so 
these sub-systems ranked in high critically area in risk matrix. Risk assessment has revealed that 
corrosion is due to material of which they are made (i.e. carbon steel). Corrosion propagation can be 
modelled based on the wall thickness and this is named as technical condition (TC). TC is divided 
to several intervals based on the wall thickness. Number of the finding in different parts of TC 
exists in the inspection summery. The inspection interval and remaining wall thickness can be 
recognized from RBI report. 
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1.4 Aims and Objectives 
Optimization of inspection programs by using the RBI analysis can be effected by several factors. 
This study is based on the technical condition of the critical components. The inspection results of 
an aged platform (SFB) are used to create an empirical formula for inspection coverage. The 
empirical formula is developed by two main factors which can affected by material, TC and type of 
inspection. The inspection coverage is condition based, so these two factors may change due to 
different condition by decision making of inspection engineer. In summary, the study provides the 
details about: 1) determining high-risk sub-systems concentrating on their RBI reports; 2) 
calculation of finding rate; 3) evaluation of inspection coverage; 4) optimization of inspection 
coverage by selecting the correct combination of factors to be assessed.  
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2 Risk Based Inspection Methodology 
Risk- based inspection (RBI) is an approach designed to make decision for inspection planning 
based on risk by combining two separate factors: the probability of failure (PoF) and the 
consequences of the failure (CoF). This method is using a 5×5 matrix to provide the simple 
evaluation. RBI values are used to optimize inspection program and recommend monitoring testing 
plans for production system. The final work of the RBI studies is showing the critical rating 
damages and inspection strategy for each piece of equipment(Bolinger et al., 1999). To carry out the 
RBI analysis, the probability of failure and the consequences of failures are calculated separately 
and they are jointed to find out the risk of failure.  Figure 2-1 illustrates the basic Risk based 
inspection concept. The left side of the diagram shows the degradation mechanisms, each of them 
may or may not lead to the loss of containment and if any degradation model exists the probability 
of failure is estimated numerically, or by using of engineering judgment.  
 
Figure 2-1 RBI Basic concept(DNV, 2010) 
 
2.1 Fundamentals aspects of RBI 
 
Inspection planning based on the RBI assessment is a cost/benefit decision framework for 
determining: 
 Where to inspect 
 What to inspect 
 How to inspect 
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 When to inspect 
And to document those requirements with respect to the safety of personnel and 
environment(Dewanto et al., 2004). The domain of the inspection planning is shown in the Figure 
2-2  
 
Figure 2-2 Risk based inspection domain (API, 2009) 
The complexity of inspection planning and maintenance is due to the: 
 Large number of parameters involved in the RBI problem 
 The complexity of units 
 The large amount of components needed to be considered 
 The theoretical structure used for the risk analysis 
2.2 RBI Methods 
 
Risk based inspection can be done using quantitative or qualitative methods but usually are carried 
out by using both the methods which is called semi-quantitative. 
Quantitative: 
The quantitative method assigns risk values to risk ranks by expressing in qualitative terms for 
probability of failure and consequences of failure. The numerical value is calculated and the system 
is systematic and it can update easily. The quantitative approach involves computer to calculate risk 
and inspection program.  The quantitative approach consists of event tree and fault tree to estimate 
the probability of each accident sequence and the result of this approach presents as risk numbers. 
Qualitative: 
In the qualitative method, instead of numerical values an expressive ranking is given such as a low, 
medium or high. It is usually based on engineering judgment and it can be completed quickly and 
with low initial cost and the result is understandable although it cannot update easily. The accuracy 
of the results is dependent on the background and experiences of the risk analysis team (DNV, 
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2010). 
Semi-quantitative 
A third method is a combination of Semi-quantitative/ Semi-qualitative and it obtains the main 
benefits of the two previous approaches. It is possible to have different cases such as below: 
 The consequence of a failure is qualitative and the probability of the failure is quantitative. 
 The CoF and PoF are quantitative with respect to the risk ranking and time of inspection is 
qualitative. 
The results are usually presented in consequences and probability categories or as a risk numbers 
but numerical values are connected with each category to calculate risk. The management of the 
organization determines approach to use the risk analysis spectrum should be considered to be a 
continuum with qualitative and quantitative approaches and everything in between being the semi-
quantitative approach (API, 2009, DNV, 2010)  (Figure 2-3) 
 
Figure 2-3 Continuum of RBI approaches (API, 2009) 
 
2.3 RBI working process 
 
Large diversity of equipment in offshore hydrocarbon production facilities leads to use of a 
conductive RBI analysis for such facilities, Figure 1-4 shows that the RBI approach is a stepwise 
approach.  The RBI process is divided into the five main steps:  
 
1. Data and Information gathering 
2. Selection of assessment 
3. Detailed assessment 
4. Planning 
5. Execution and evaluation 
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Figure 2-4 RBI Approach (Lanquetin et al., 2007) 
 
2.3.1 Data and Information gathering 
 
The objective of this step is to provide an overview of the data that may necessary to assess 
potential damage mechanisms, potential failure modes, probabilities and consequences to develop 
inspection planning and RBI plan. The main groups of data need to carry out the RBI analysis are 
divided to: 
 Inspection data: The data which are expected to come out from inspection activities. 
Each degradation mechanism has its own specification.  
 Consequences data: Specification should be prepared to show what is expected from 
quantified risk analysis.  
 Engineering / process data: basic data such as temperature, pressure and dimensions 
which are generated by engineering and operation disciplines (DNV, 2010). 
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2.3.1.1 RBI Data needs 
 Management of static data: Information including the updated version of basic 
equipment/piping data, design data, material information, inspection history, schedule 
planning, associated equipment data, material supplied data that are effectively gathered and 
networked with inspection procedures, documents, graphic files, damage photos and 
monitored equipment data. 
 Analysis of equipment inspection: A complete database that meets international standards is 
created to include calculation equations and material reference Tables as requires by ASME, 
API, BS, amongst other references (Tien et al., 2007). 
 
2.3.1.2 Data quality 
 
The accuracy of the RBI analysis has a direct relation with the quality of data. It is helpful if the 
data are up-to-date and validated by knowledgeable persons. Assumptions are another sources 
which can significantly impact the analysis, for instance, if nominal thickness may be used because 
the baseline inspection were not performed, this assumption effects corrosion rate and it impacts on 
equipment life. In addition, comparing data from inspection to the expected damage and rates is 
another source of error and statistics may be useful to compare with previous measurements on that 
system or similar systems at the site.(Schröder and Kauer, 2004, DNV, 2010) 
2.3.2 Selection of assessment 
 
The purpose of this step is to evaluate which of the elements are judged to make a major 
contribution to the risk levels. The consequences of failure and probability of failure are assessed 
separately to find out they are significant or insignificant (resulting in high, low or medium risk). 
Generally low risk items will require minimum inspection and medium and high risk items will 
need more detailed evaluation. 
2.3.2.1 Facilities Screening 
Screening at facility level may be carried out by a simplified qualitative RBI in all types of plants 
such as oil and gas production facilities, oil and gas processing and transportation terminal, 
refineries and pipelines, liquid natural gas etc. and it includes: 
(a) History of degradation and failures in each facility 
(b) Age of facility 
(c) Product value 
(d) Closeness to environmentally sensitive area  and public 
2.3.2.2 Process Units Screening  
The initial step is screening the process units to categorize the relative risk and based on the higher 
priority areas suggest which process units to begin with. It also provides level of detailed 
assessment in the various units. 
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2.3.2.3 System within process unit screening 
The process units are divided into sub systems and components. Process flow diagrams can be used 
to recognize the systems plus information about process condition, historical problems and damage 
mechanisms. The consequences of failure and probability of failure are assessed depending on 
information which is available. 
When the RBI assessment defines a process unit, it is usually best to include all sub systems within 
the unit based on the relative risk of sub-systems, relative consequence of failure of sub-systems, 
expected benefit of sub-system and relative reliability of sub-system. So, those subsystems and 
components which need more assessment are identified (DNV, 2010). 
 
2.3.3 Detailed assessment 
 
The elements with identified medium or high risk from previous stages are considered in more 
detail. The objective of this assessment is identifying the degradation mechanisms, estimating the 
extent of damage, estimating inspection time which leads to acceptable risk level. The detailed RBI 
assessment includes review of both PoF and CoF for normal operating. (Figure 2-5) 
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Figure 2-5: RBI framework (DNV, 2010) 
2.3.4 Planning 
 
The results of the RBI screening and detailed assessment are used as an input for inspection 
planning.  As a result of their interaction between RBI analysis and planners, a preliminary 
inspection plan including time schedule are provided considering the available personnel, extent of 
shut down necessary, interaction with maintenance activities and data base set up. The results of this 
part of the assessment provide the basis for final inspection planning.  
2.3.5 Execution and Evaluation 
 
All of the data from pervious steps should be stored in the inspection management data base. The 
amount of data depends on the capacity of the database; some part of the data base can also store 
Risk 
Acceptance 
Criteria 
Hazard  
Identification 
PoF CoF 
Risk 
analysis 
Risk 
Evaluation 
Inspection and  
Monitoring program 
Medium/high 
Low 
Grouping and 
classification and 
risk analysis 
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pictures, documents and videos. The following issues should be considered: 
1) Data quality: the quality of data should be checked and data relationship should be 
maintained to help coordination with maintenance data. 
2) Working process: The working process for both maintaining and inspection findings should 
be evaluated.  
3) Updating: The changes in plans and data are evaluated by personnel for their effect on 
installation safety and operation. 
4) Data storage: Location of data storage should be considered and the data server should be 
sufficient for necessary traffic , in addition in the case of network failure or damage, assess 
to the server should be possible.  
5) Infrastructure capacity: the data server is to be accessed from a distance for instance from 
offshore or at remote locations and must be able to handle the necessary traffic in addition to 
normal operational traffic (DNV, 2010). 
2.4 Assessing Probability of failure 
 
Probability analysis in RBI is carried out to estimate the probability of consequence from a loss of 
containment that leads to the damage mechanism. In RBI analysis the risk value determines the 
inspection plan and high risk equipment becomes the main focus of inspection resources. The total 
probability of failure is the sum of the probabilities of all events that can cause failure. 
PoFtechnical = It is related to the natural random normal man-made uncertainty  
PoFaccidental= It is related to the accidental events including environmental loads, those can predict 
from historical data. 
PoFgross-error= Gross error happens during design, fabrication, installation, and operation. Gross 
errors are as result of human error and it is difficult to predict the probability of gross errors, 
however the management system tries to avoid this error. 
PoFunknown= It is related to the unexpected phenomena. Usually there is low probability even though 
sometimes they have high consequences. 
PoFtotal= ∑ PoFtechnical, PoFaccidental, PoFgross-error, PoFunknown (API, 2009, Tien et al., 2007) 
 
2.4.1 Units of measure in the PoF analysis 
The probability of failure is usually expressed by the frequency and frequency is the number of 
events occurring during a specific time which is called fixed interval. So, the frequency is expressed 
as number of events per interval. In qualitative analysis PoF is categorized e.g. high, medium and 
low. Table 2-1 is an example of six levels for PoF (API, 2009, Peterson and Jablonski, 2003). 
Table 2-1: Probability of failure 
Possible Qualitative Rank Annual failure Probability or Frequency 
Remote <0.00001 
Very low 0.00001 to 0.0001 
Low 0.0001 to 0.001 
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Moderate 0.001 to 0.01 
High 0.01 to 0.1 
Very high >0.1 
 
2.4.2 Types of probability analysis 
 
The probability of failure can be considered in quantitative or qualitative forms which are discussed 
as below. 
2.4.2.1 Quantitative assessment method 
 
Quantitative method is the probabilistic approach where specific failure data are used to calculate 
PoF, so, PoFtechnical is normally addressed.  When there is insufficient failure data on specific 
component, the general data of the company are used and by increasing or decreasing the predicted 
failure frequencies for the specific component, the modified values may be prepared. 
 
2.4.2.2 Qualitative PoF analysis 
 
The probability of failure is carried out for each units, group or equipment item depend on the 
different methodology, the categories may defined as low, medium, high or may have numerical 
descriptors. The estimation of probability is in qualitative manner and is presented by the 
experienced personnel. 
2.4.3 Determination of PoF 
 
Depending on which types of probability analysis are chosen, the probability of failure is 
determined by damage mechanism rates of the equipment (internal or external) and effectiveness of 
the inspection program.  
 
2.4.3.1 Degradation mechanisms 
 
Degradation may occur in different form of corrosion, erosion, crack, fatigue and stress and all of 
these forms can lead to failure and disastrous consequences of the system. The marine operation and 
process condition and also materials of construction result in operational challenges due to damage 
mechanisms (Markeset and Ratnayake, 2010). 
The RBI objective is to guide management’s decision process and prioritize resources to manage 
risk. Inspection affects the uncertainty of the risk evaluation by identifying of deterioration and 
probability of failure and it leads to risk reduction.  In-service inspection is mainly concerned with 
detection and monitoring of degradation. Failure of equipment is not avoided by inspection 
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activities unless the inspection affects the PoF. The PoF due to such deterioration is a function of 
four factors: 
 Deterioration type and mechanism 
 Rate of deterioration 
 Probability of deterioration states with inspection techniques 
 Equipment tolerance based on the type of deterioration 
One way of describing the damage mechanism is to group components that have the same material 
and are exposed to the same internal and external environment: 
1. Construction material 
2. Product services 
3. Environment surrounding 
4. Protective measure 
5. Operating conditions (DNV, 2010) 
 The following factors should be considered in the determination of damage rates: 
a) process temperature 
b) pH value 
c) amount of dissolved oxygen 
d) component geometry 
e) material 
f) wall thickness 
g) coating condition 
h) flow velocity 
i) CO2 level 
j) humidity 
k) pressure (API, 2009) 
The frequency of failure is used to determine the probability of failure. The history of all equipment 
failures are stored in the data bases and it can be organized by the software. 
2.4.3.2 Degradation Modelling 
 
The degradation modelling and PoF evaluation purpose are as follow: 
 Assess the current probability for each tag 
 Evaluate the damage development with respect to time 
 Expected damage that may be subjected at a component  
 Access recording of various inspection programs 
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 Provide a method of risk evaluation (API, 2009) 
 
The expected damage rate is categorized in three types: 
(a) Insignificant model: There is no significant degradation expected for the component 
(PoF=10-5 per year). Inspection of the components in this model is not necessary expect for 
checking that the location of inspection is valid. 
(b) Unknown model: When the product is an unknown substance then the initially probability of 
failure should be assigned and the need for further investigation of consequences of failure 
should be indicated.  
(c) Rate Model: The rate model is related to the damages resulting in a decrease of wall 
thickness. The rate of wall thickness depends on material properties, wall thickness, fluid 
properties and operating conditions.  
(d) Susceptibility model: In this model, damages of components occur because of external event 
after unknown duration (DNV, 2010). 
2.5 Assessing Consequence of failure 
 
The consequence of failure is related to all consequences which are important for operator, 
including economic effects  (lost production, repair), environment  (short and long term) and safety 
and health of personnel and people outside of facility(Schröder and Kauer, 2004). Consequences of 
Failure are usually discussed to consist of four aspects, i.e. safety  (CoFsafety), health  (CoFhealth), 
environment  (CoFenvironment) and business  (CoFbusiness).(Heerings and den Herder, 2003) 
2.5.1 Types of consequences analysis 
 
The consequences of failure have been categorized as quantitative and qualitative methods. These 
assessments are described below: 
2.5.1.1 Quantitative assessment methods 
 
Quantitative method use logic model to illustrate the combination of events to present effect of 
failure on people, environment and property. This model calculates the CoF based on some factors 
and result of quantitative analysis is usually numerical: 
 Type and states of process fluid in the equipment 
 Process operating variables such as pressure and temperature 
 Failure mode and leak size (DNV, 2010) 
2.5.1.2 Qualitative assessment methods 
 
The qualitative assessment method is based on the engineering judgement as result of equipment 
operating condition and process liquids. The consequence of failure is estimated for each unit and 
categorized such as high, medium and low(DNV, 2010, Dewanto et al., 2004)  
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2.5.1.2.1 Screening Level 
 
Screening is commonly carried out by expert judgment without any numerical analysis for the four 
different aspects of CoF: Safety, Health, Environment and Business. Highest rating of the four 
aspects is determined by overall consequence level on the different aspects. This means that it is 
necessary to balance the screening classification on the different aspects. It is reasonable to organize 
the classes cover the consequence of failure from smallest to largest possibility in different aspects. 
An example of possible classification is given in different Tables (2-2 to 2-5) as below (Heerings 
and den Herder, 2003, Peterson and Jablonski, 2003, Tien et al., 2007) : 
Table 2-2 possible classification for CoFsafety 
Consequence  Class Description 
5 Fatalities 
4 Permanent injuries 
3 Injury with hospital treatment 
2 Injury 
1 No injury 
 
Table 2-3 possible classification for CoFhealth 
Consequence  Class Description 
5 Long term health effects with possible death 
4 Permanent health problems 
3 Short term health effects 
2 Minimal health effects 
1 No effect 
 
Table 2-4 possible classification for CoFenvironment 
Consequence  Class Description 
5 Serious damage 
4 Damage, no mitigation possible 
3 Damage, no mitigation possible 
2 Minor damage 
1 No damage 
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Table 2-5 possible classification for CoFbusiness 
Consequence  Class Description ($) 
5 >  10,000,000 
4 1,000,000-10,000,000 
3 100,000-1,000,000 
2 10,000-100,000 
1 <10,000 
 
 
2.6 Risk assessment using risk matrix 
 
For risk ranking, the consequence and probabilities of failure are categorized and presented in risk 
matrix. However, the company is free to choose the number of classes, and it is not necessary to use 
the same number of classes for consequences as for probabilities. It should also be mentioned that 
often the risk scale (low, medium, high) or the colour scheme (red, yellow, green) implicitly 
introduces risk acceptance criteria, thus should be carefully selected. Below is shown an example of 
a risk decision matrix for use in consequence classification, maintenance planning, inspection 
planning and for prioritising work orders Statfjord B.  
The probability of failure is divided in five steps and the time interval for inspection is mentioned as 
6, 72,120 etc months. The consequences of failure are categorized from 1 to 9 for health, economy 
and environment. 
 
Figure 2-6 Risk matrix used for consequence classification and for decisions (Helgesen and 
Birkeland, 2009) 
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2.7 Summary of Risk Based Inspection Methodology: 
 
Risk based inspection is a systematic, structured and participative approach for developing 
inspection plans using risk management techniques that identify the likelihood of failure by a 
certain degradation mechanism and the consequences of such failure from the human, 
environmental, and commercial viewpoints (Santos and Hajri, 2000). In this chapter the main issues 
about RBI is described which are the basis of this study. RBI is a methodology to improve the 
management of risk through closely focussing on the critical areas of the plant, and reducing efforts 
on the non-critical areas. In order to this aim in next chapter the function and criticality of the 
subsystems on Statfjord B are discussed. 
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3 Inspection strategy for subsystems on Statfjord B  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the construction strategy for condition monitoring of static 
process, structures, subsea installations and equipment on the Statfjord B field. Statfjord B started 
production 3 years after Statfjord A, in 1982. The Statfjord B platform supplies Kårstø with oil and 
gas. The concrete structure is 175m high, has 4 shafts and 24 cells and providing facilities for 
drilling, production, oil storage and accommodation. The topside production capacity is 250 000 
bopd and 6 500 million m3/d gas (www.akerSolutions.com) . The inspection strategy will provide 
guidelines on how state control activity is desired cared for and contribute to safe operation and the 
desired regularity of the system throughout the facility life. This will partly be achieved by the use 
of risk assessments and condition and performance monitoring of specific barriers. 
In sections 3-3 and 3-4 are described detailed strategies for pipes, valves and tanks / containers. For 
structures, subsea installations and equipment, this document only references to established 
Framework and the annual program. The strategies will form the basis for the preparation of long-
term plans, annual plans and detailed inspection program.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-1: Statfjord A and B, C(Technology, 2009) 
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The basis for the choice of strategy is based on: 
 Statutory Requirements 
 Statoil governing requirements  
 Operating Conditions 
 Inspection history and experience 
 Quality of material and corrosion protection 
 Incidents 
 RBI analysis 
 DFI-resume 
 Academic assessment of technical condition 
 Experience from other operating units 
 Condition of insulation, cladding and surface protection  
 
Maintenance will be as far as possible be condition based, i.e., predicting the appropriate time for 
maintenance by means of state control and state analysis to avoid unintended fatalities, unnecessary 
maintenance and downtime for the plant. For condition monitoring of piping, valves, containers / 
tanks, structures, pipelines and subsea installations be established discovery management process 
followed to ensure the integrity of the equipment. Construction strategy and long-term plan will be 
reviewed annually for revision. 
3.1 Requirements to work process  
 
3.1.1 Strategy 
 
Selected strategy for condition monitoring identifies and prioritizes of components in the planning 
of state control based on extensive use of risk assessments. Risk assessments should include 
operational experience results from the inspection and monitoring, analysis, modification and any 
change in operating parameters govern the determination of inspection intervals and scope. It 
should also be clearly stated in the program established degradation mechanisms governing the 
activity, so the failure modes that are under development or has occurred are identified and 
corrected.  
Control loop for condition monitoring is a key element for the choice of strategy and illustrates the 
relationship between various sub-activities additions. Activities that are included here are the 
development of inspection programs and plans, construction inspection, reporting and evaluation of 
results. (Helgesen and Birkeland, 2009) 
3.1.2  Long­term plans, annual plans and detailed program  
 
Based on the strategy for condition monitoring long-term plan is developed for each installation. 
Long-term plan is the strategic basis for the preparation of annual plans and detailed program. 
Long-term plan describes the pipes, containers and tanks that will be subject to state control the 
Developing Empirical Formula to Calculate Inspection Coverage                                                                              
 
 
 
 
26
individual years. Long-term plan are reviewed for update annually.  
Year of condition monitoring equipment are determined for each group (pipes) and container, where 
the number of inspections determined by the experiences they have from previous inspections. The 
annual plans and detailed program will include results from man-RBI analysis, inspection history, 
monitoring data, the expected degradation rate, time from the previous inspection and any changes 
in process parameters applied. For each program that are established shall be prepared a brief 
summary of the priorities that form the basis for the program. Regardless of the analysis will be 
established annual program for area-based general visual inspection (GVI) where the structure and 
all the static process, regardless of the system and product code, shall be inspected externally with 
regard to map of general condition.  
Program Establishment and its execution shall safeguard the initiation, execution, reporting, 
evaluation and follow-up of the condition of the equipment development. Detailed programs will be 
categorized in programs for: 
 not stop depending on inspection 
 stop depending on inspection (Helgesen and Birkeland, 2009) 
3.1.3 Retail Program for state control that requires closure  
 
An inspection program shall be prepared dependent on closure of production critical equipment. 
The implementation of turnaround every two years, but the program is also relevant for other 
planned shutdowns. The program possible extension can be coordinated with other activities such as 
suspension modifications, other FV programs and execution of corrective maintenance. In some 
cases, state control activities defined in the application the premises for the duration of shutdown. In 
such cases, the need for state control activities specifically documented with respect to risk or 
cost/benefit- assessments.  
3.1.4 Reporting, treatment of the findings and evaluation of state  
 
All inspection results should be reported in the Company's respective computer system, 
respectively, for the RIS process piping and pressure vessels and subsea installations. Any repairs 
and replacements must also be registered in the same systems. Inspection results from the 
inspection of valves should be reported to the drawing / sketch and this should be entered in the 
RIS. Reporting of inspection history should be according to the fixed level of detail to allow for 
good analysis for the optimization of inspection programs. All thickness measurements / corrosion 
findings reported with measured values.  
The degree of detail of the report should be sufficient to carry out the necessary evaluation and any 
additional analysis. Report is completed by drawings, photos, video, sketches and documentation to 
be used as substrates in further evaluation.  
For underwater systems and structures under water their own established management system used. 
All findings are listed here, are reviewed together with system/field manager, and actions defined 
and documented (Helgesen and Birkeland, 2009). Technical condition will be evaluated on an 
ongoing basis and described in established software tools. The evaluation will be a short text 
description of the technical condition of the system. It should here partly reflected the inspection 
results, the result was as expected, the damage mechanism expected, degradation rate, as well as to 
provide input to any recommended priorities for the coming inspection program and update of plant 
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strategy.  
 
3.2 Inspection Types 
3.2.1 General Visual Inspection (GVI) 
 
The inspection is intended to provide a general picture of the condition of the inspection object. 
GVI is usually performed as area-based inspection, i.e. all static equipment in a specific area 
inspected, but GVI can also be specified for individual equipment and components. In connection 
with entry and visual inspection of containers, all interior equipment inspected. When performing a 
visual inspection checklists used established in the RIS. 
3.2.2 Near visual inspection (NVE) 
 
Near visual inspection (NVE) aims to provide a more accurate picture of the condition of inspection 
object. The distance to the inspection object is relatively small (approximately 0.5 m) and 
inspection object should be sufficiently clean. 
3.2.3 Non­destructive Inspection (NDT) 
 
Non-destructive Inspection (NDT) is defined as where an inspection using the technical equipment 
is in able to detect and to some extent size chart different types of degradation, which is not without 
further can be mapped visually. Examples of such devices may include ultrasound, radiography, 
eddy current, magnetic particle, penetrating fluid, vibration measurement equipment, etc. Choice of 
inspection method should be based on the method's probability of detection of the expected 
degradation mechanism.  
It is recommended to use an inspection method with a PoD value of at least 0.5. Interfaces, what is 
covered by the construction strategy product codes and the containers / tanks that are discussed in 
sections 3-3 and 3-4 are part of the strategy.   
The strategy initially covers the piping and pressure vessels, including mechanical connectors, 
support ring, valves, manifolds, equipment packages possibly untagged pipes in packs, exhaust 
ducts, flexible hoses, cyclones, plate exchangers, day tanks, hull and deck tanks, pulse suppressors, 
accumulator bottles, unless otherwise specified (Out et al., 1995). 
 
3.2.4 Surface coating and insulation 
 
Surface condition monitoring and maintenance is based on the Company's Structured Surface Long-
Term Care concept (SOLV), where Task Manager surface maintenance - Statfjord, is responsible for 
performing a condition survey as required. Task Manager surface maintenance is responsible for 
monitoring the insulation condition and maintenance of insulation, including pipe penetrations and 
passive fire protection. 
 
It is noted that the execution of site based general visual inspection shall be reported injuries 
insulation that may indicate water penetration and subsequent likelihood of corrosion under 
isolation. Completion of area-based visual inspection is established as a summary report 
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observation with respect to insulation condition. This will be reviewed with the Task manager 
surface maintenance. Follow-up of previously reported findings and observations are performed. 
For pipes and equipment with high risk sampling, check of state under insulation even if the 
enclosures seem complete, shall be carried out (Helgesen and Birkeland, 2009) 
 
3.2.5 Monitoring 
 
It will be carried out monitoring of important parameters that may be significant with respect to 
state and state control. Parameters to be monitored, but are not limited to, among other things: 
 The results of erosion monitoring 
 Sand Production / sand monitoring  
 H2S in the well flow 
 Oxygen and chlorine content in water injection 
 pH, chlorine quantity and amount of nitrite in cooling and heating medium 
3.3 Condition monitoring of piping systems 
 
The strategy for condition monitoring is determined based on the material / medium combination, is 
failure probability and consequence of a failure with respect to safety and production regularity. 
Condition monitoring of piping systems on Statfjord B are given in the RBI analysis, annual plan 
and detailed application. The plan is structured by equipment groups.  
Equipment groups are defined for the main process and utility systems. The various equipment 
groups (sub-systems) are sorted into categories. Figure 3-1 shows definition of sub systems. 
 
Figure 3-1: Subsystems (http://www.scribd.com/doc) 
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3.4 Sub systems (Equipment Groups) 
 
 
The following categories are used: 
 Flow lines - producers (oil / gas) & water / gas injector 
 Production piping - two-phase, liquid, gas 
 Ventilation to the flare / Depressurization 
 Closed drainage 
 Produced water 
 Gas re-injection 
 Gas lift 
 Oil sludge 
 Condensate 
 Fuel gas 
 Water Injection 
 Jet water 
 Ballast 
 Seawater 
 Fire Water 
 Kill mud 
 Glycol 
 Heating medium 
 Chemicals / Methanol 
 Diesel 
 Front draining from classified site 
 Instrument air 
 Hydraulic oil, lube and seal oil 
 Other systems (Helgesen and Birkeland, 2009) 
 
The RBI reports are including this information and Figure 3-2 shows the sample of RBI report on 
Statfjord B for one of the production flow line which is defined for different equipment groups: 
 Description of equipment group 
 Process Description for equipment group 
 Corrosive content Injury Probability  (POF) 
 Comment damage mechanism 
 Last main inspection performed 
 Next estimated inspection 
 The next scheduled major inspection 
 The minimum calculated inspection interval  (months) 
 Number of primary inspections 
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Figure 3-3: Sample of RBI report (AkerSolutions data base)
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Sub-system Material Quality 
 
Degradation mechanisms 
 
Inspection History Strategy 
Flow line oil 
producing  
 (P/PT) 
Carbon steel CO2 corrosion, MIC, H2S, 
erosion, corrosion and 
Atmospheric KUI. 
Corrosion of flange extended inspection of lines of separation trains at 
least 3 months before the shutdown 
Flow lines gas 
producers  
 (P / PT) 
Mainly Duplex, but 
some prick in carbon 
steel 
CO2 corrosion, erosion, MIC, 
H2S and atmospheric 
corrosion. 
Sand production  The carbon steel should be followed up with 
more frequent inspection schedule for inspection 
three times a year, The plans for random checks 
on selected erosion vulnerable points are 
followed up with NDT. 
Water injection 
flow lines  
 (WI) 
Carbon steel, but 
newer pipelines are 
used duplex and 6Mo 
Water injection: carbon steel - 
corrosion in water  (inside), 
Stainless - Corrosion in water  
(inside), atmospheric corrosion 
Corrosion in bends, 
welds pipes / and 
reduces the flanges 
Water injectors in carbon steel: performed 
internal visual inspection of using NDT methods 
(thickness measurements. 
Water injectors in the duplex:  
NDT, especially focusing on drainage plugs 
Flow lines gas 
injection  
 (FG) 
Carbon steel. CO2 corrosion and 
Atmospheric corrosion 
Inspection Volume 
has been relatively 
low 
Inspection carried out mainly by means of NDT 
methods, and concentrated on areas where there 
is danger of condensation due to failure of the gas 
drying system, pressure reduction, etc 
Process 
hydrocarbon 
two-phase 
  (P / PT) 
Carbon steel CO2 corrosion, erosion, MIC, 
atmospheric corrosion, and 
KUI 
Corrosion and 
erosion 
Expanded inspection of lines of separation trains 
at least 3 months before the shutdown. Duplex 
systems inspected at random by some erosion in 
exposed areas inspected. 
Process 
hydrocarbon 
liquid  (P / PL 
Carbon steel CO2 corrosion, erosion, MIC, 
KUI and atmospheric 
corrosion. 
 
Corrosion problems 
are mainly located 
between main 
separator pipelines 
high inspection volume especially for oil sludge 
and oil recycling system 
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Sub-system Material Quality 
 
Degradation mechanisms 
 
Inspection History Strategy 
Process 
hydrocarbon 
gas 
 (P / PV) 
Carbon steel CO2 corrosion, KUI and 
atmospheric corrosion 
Corrosion rate is low Inspected annually by NDT. 
Condensate 
 (P / PL) 
Carbon steel CO2 corrosion, KUI and 
atmospheric corrosion 
Exterior surface 
corrosion and KUI 
are revealed on some 
pipelines. 
Annual GVI and spot checks with emphasis on 
focus areas. 
Gas re-
injection  (GR) 
Carbon steel CO2 corrosion, KUI and 
atmospheric corrosion. 
 
 
Inspections are 
carried out, has 
mainly been directed 
towards the drainage 
lines where there is a 
risk of condensation. 
 
GR-lines will still be subject to annual inspection 
Gas lift  
 (GL) 
Mainly is carbon 
steel and duplex  
 
 
CO2 corrosion, KUI and 
atmospheric corrosion. 
This system has not 
been a part of the 
initial strategy in the 
past 
 
Ventilation to 
the flare 
 (VF) 
Mainly carbon steel, 
316 is also used  
CO2 corrosion, erosion, MIC, 
KUI, atmospheric corrosion 
and pitting on the exterior 316 
External corrosion The current inspection volume terms to internal 
corrosion and erosion 
Closed 
drainage  (CD) 
Carbon steel and 
GRE 
CO2 corrosion, MIC, 
atmospheric corrosion, KUI 
 
High corrosion rates Annual performance monitoring will continue to 
be implemented with a focus on hydrocarbon 
lines. 
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Sub-system Material Quality 
 
Degradation mechanisms 
 
Inspection History Strategy 
 Slurry Oil  
 (P / PL) 
Carbon steel 
 
CO2 corrosion, MIC, 
atmospheric corrosion, and 
KUI 
 
Inspection history 
shows many 
discoveries that can 
be caused by MIC. 
MIC should be performed yearly thickness 
measurements with the increased volume on the 
focus areas. Bacterial measurements 
recommended in the monitored system. 
Water injection  
(WI) 
Carbon steel Carbon Steel - Corrosion in 
water  (inside), CO2 corrosion  
(PWRI), MIC and atmospheric 
corrosion 
Visual inspection and 
sampling of NDT. 
Condition monitoring is performed using the 
NDT methods 
Water  
 (WF) 
Carbon steel, duplex, 
titanium, ELASTIC 
PIPE and GRE. 
 
 
Carbon Steel - Corrosion in 
water  (inside), Stainless - 
Corrosion in water  (inside), 
KUI and atmospheric 
corrosion 
Leaks in the system As visual inspections an annual random sampling 
(NDT) of selected nozzles (<= 4). 
Fuel Gas 
 (FG) 
Carbon steel, but also 
316 and 321 
CO2 corrosion, KUI, 
atmospheric corrosion and 
pitting on the exterior 316 
External corrosion Because of previously reported external corrosion 
inspection system expands the scope. 
 
Ballast  
 (WB, WL) 
Cement-coated 
carbon steel, as well 
as some GRE and 
high alloy material. 
Larger dimensions 
are inside segment 
coated.  
 
 
Carbon Steel - Corrosion in 
water  (inside), MIC, KUI and 
atmospheric corrosion 
NDT inspection 
methods have been 
relatively limited 
LTP and possibly in connection with video 
inspection turn around. 
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Sub-system Material Quality 
 
Degradation mechanisms 
 
Inspection History Strategy 
Water Jet  
 (WJ) 
Carbon steel 
Carbon Steel - Corrosion in 
water (inside), MIC, erosion 
and atmospheric corrosion. 
Severe corrosion and 
high corrosion rates. 
 
Annual state control is maintained. This is 
performed by NDT methods, 
Seawater  
 (SW) 
Carbon steel, Cuni 
and GRE. Larger 
sizes in carbon steel 
are segment coated.  
 
Carbon Steel - Corrosion in 
water (inside), Cuni - corrosion 
in water (inside), KUI and 
atmospheric corrosion. 
Visually inspected 
internally and 
inspection through 
NDT 
LTP and possibly video inspection in connection 
with turnarounds 
Kill mud  
 (KM) 
Carbon steel CO2 corrosion, MIC, erosion, 
atmospheric corrosion. 
severe corrosion 
findings 
Follow-up inspection of previous discoveries and 
random control 
Glycol / Rich 
glycol  
 (KG / KW) 
Carbon steel, but 
something Duplex 
CO 2 Corrosion, KUI and 
atmospheric corrosion.  
 
History is not 
complete  
Corrosion rate is too low to initiate the inspection 
Chemicals  
 (C) 
Carbon steel, 316, 
321, 6Mo, duplex and 
titanium 
Little or no internal 
degradation expected 
Atmospheric corrosion 
 
History is not 
complete 
Annual GVI with a focus on external conditions 
Diesel  
 (OF) 
Carbon steel, 316 and 
6Mo 
Carbon Steel - Corrosion in 
water  (inside), MIC, 
atmospheric corrosion, KUI 
and external pitting on 316 
History is not 
complete 
General visual inspection is performed annually 
with a special focus on lines that cross over hot 
surfaces. 
Open drainage 
from the 
classified area  
 (OD) 
Carbon steel, but 316, 
Cuni and GRP 
CO2 corrosion of carbon steel - 
corrosion in water  (inside), 
Cuni - corrosion in water  
(inside), MIC, KUI  
History is not 
complete 
Annual GVI with a focus on external conditions. 
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Sub-system Material Quality 
 
Degradation mechanisms 
 
Inspection History Strategy 
Instrument Air  
(IA) 
Carbon steel and 316 Carbon Steel - Corrosion in 
water (inside), atmospheric 
corrosion, KUI and external 
pitting on stainless. 
History is not 
complete 
Annual GVI and monitoring function to air-dry 
plant. 
Hydraulic oil, 
lubricating oil 
and seal oil  
 (HO / OH / 
OL / OS) 
Carbon steel, 316, 
304, 6Mo and Duplex 
Corroding water, atmospheric 
corrosion KUI and outer 
pitting on 316 
History is not 
complete 
Annual GVI and monitoring water content in oils. 
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3.5 Difficulties of separating system into the equipment groups 
 
It is often advantageous to group equipment within a process unit into systems, loops, or circuits, 
where common environmental operating conditions exist based on process chemistry, pressure and 
temperature, metallurgy, equipment design and operating history. By separating a process unit into 
systems, the equipment can be screened together saving time in compare of treating each piece of 
equipment separately. In case the risks of each piece of equipment in the system show a common 
sensitivity to changes in process conditions, then a screening can create one single category with 
common variables and ranges for the whole system (API, 2009, William, 1981). Although, group of 
systems is arranged in a specific fashion to produce a product or service, sometimes engineers are 
faced with some problems when following equipment groups which are separating a process unit. 
In the Statfjord plant, the RBI analysis has been done by client. The Inspection Engineers believe 
the RBI analysis should be done by who knows exactly the process of the plant. Hence, this section 
is mentioned some difficulties which happened in the Statfjord plant by separating the equipment 
group. 
 
 On Statfjord A, there are two different groups WB-002 and WB-003. The WB-002 is the 
ballast water system and WB-003 is the drainage system. The water flows to and from cell 
51, which store the reclaimed oil, is controlled by the ballast water tank in the utility shaft 
that has inlet system from the sea. The line DC-3151 goes to the system and makes it 
possible to flash the line in ballast system but the problem is that this line should be in the 
drainage group, not ballast water group system (William, 1981). The leakage happened in 
this subsystem and because access to this line is difficult, the inspection engineers decided 
to change the material into duplex steel. The P&ID diagram of this equipment group is 
illustrated in the Figure 3-4 and the DC-3151 shows with red colour. 
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Figure 3-4: P&ID diagram of the equipment group (AkerSolutions data base) 
 
 Another example is the equipment seawater group WS-004, which has the probability of 
consequences from 2 to 8 .When we look at different tag numbers in one equipment group; 
we expect that they have same condition. It could be reasonable that after and before of one 
valve, we have different probabilities of failure but diverge of consequences of failure is not 
uNDTrstandable. So, there is a question; is this equipment group selected correct or not? 
 
 When two equipment groups are separated by the valves, the line between them are included 
in both equipment groups and the Inspection analysis for the line has been done twice. 
Sometimes, one equipment group is categorized by high risk and the other one is in low risk 
and usually the line is included in the high risk. In Figure 3-5, the valve F is analysed twice 
for both equipment groups on the left and right side. 
 
Figure 3-5: Separating to equipment group (http://people.bath.ac.uk/cestjm/equipment.html) 
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 There are tag numbers that occur in more than one equipment group and they have same 
condition but the tags inspection results should be analysed for all of them. As a result, several 
of the same analyses will be repeated and this leads to overall increase in the cost. For example, 
Figure 3-6 illustrates, the line 8-Gr-1001-MJ1 in the Statfjord B,  has been analysed for 6th 
times
 
Figure 3-6: Line 8-Gr-1001-MJ1 group (AkerSolutions data base) 
 
3.6    Risk matrix for different sub­systems 
 
Figure 3-7 illustrates a risk decision matrix for different subsystems on Statfjord B. In the other 
words the risk classification of different sub system which are discussed above are summarized in 
this matrix.  This matrix is created by using the RIS data which shows the level of POF and COF 
for each sub-system. 
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RBI MATRIX 
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Figure 3-7: Risk Matrix for the subsystems on Statfjord B group (Helgesen and Birkeland, 2009) 
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3.7 Summary of Inspection strategy for Subsystems: 
 
This chapter mentions plan strategy of inspection and condition monitoring of different equipment 
group on Statfjord B. The inspection strategy will provide guidelines on how state control activity is 
desired cared for and contribute to safe operation and the desired regularity of the system 
throughout the facility life. This will partly be achieved by the use of risk assessments and condition 
and performance monitoring of specific barriers. The system divides to several sub systems and by 
using RBI reports, the most important issues such as material quality, degradation mechanisms and 
inspection history of each sub systems are covered in the Table. In addition, some of the problems 
which are caused because of dividing the system to different equipment groups are discoursed. 
Moreover, there is risk matrix for Statfjord B based on the different subsystems which show 
criticality of them. 
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4 Selecting critical Sub systems  
In chapter 3, all of the subsystem is involved on Statfjord B is described. In this chapter, 3 main 
subsystems, production, flow line and closed drainage are discussed. 
 
4.1 Flow line Subsystem (wells) 
 
The purpose of the wellheads and manifolds is to control of oil flow from the reservoir until 
emergency shutdown valve (ESV) in front of the inlet and test separator. The purpose of the gas lift 
is to increase oil recovery. Gas export quality is headed down the production tubing to make the 
well flow is lighter and lifting production fluid.  
Gas lift is installed on the installation due to pressure reduction in the reservoir. The subsystem 
includes well-controlled surface safety valve (SSV), Christmas trees, flowlines, valves and 
manifolds. Statfjord B platform has 42 slots in total. These slots are used to drill: 
 
 Production wells 
 Water injection  
 Gas injection 
 
Fluid flow taken from the reservoir is a complex mixture of oil and gas. In addition, it comes with 
some water and solid particles in fluid flow. Fluid flow under high pressure must be controlled and 
regulated carefully. This is done by using a series of valves placed in the well and wellhead 
equipment. The fluid flows from each well through the wellhead and the corresponding low 
pressure production manifold, then, flow on to the production process. The flow from each well can 
also be controlled to the test manifold and further to the test separator.  
 
On top of production casing and the Christmas tree is located. Christmas tree consists of hydraulic 
and manual valves for operation during the operation and well maintenance. A throttle valve 
(choke) is placed on the flow tube between the Christmas tree and manifold. This has the task of 
regulating the flow of oil from the well. Each well is shut-off valve and check valve in front of the 
manifold. 
 
 
4.1.1 System Connection: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Instrument air  
Hydraulic System 
Chemicals 
Reservoir 
Stream 
 
Wellhead and manifold 
Inlet separator CD2001 
Flare 
Separator CD2002 
Test separator CD-2014 
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4.1.2 Description of process  
 
 
After the flow from each well has passed the check valve, the flow is controlled into its production, 
manifold or test low pressure manifold. This control is done using the motor operated valves. In 
production manifold HA2002A / B and HA2005A / B fluid flows from the production wells to the 
inlet separator CD2001. This is the first step in the main process. The well stream from wells with 
low pressure goes to the low pressure manifold HA2003/HA2004. Each test manifold HA2001A / B 
and HA2006A / B has a connection with each of the production wells in the line it is associated. 
When in use, it will only treat the flow from one well at a time. The flow from the test manifold is 
then further to the test separator CD2014 (Oma and Birkeland, 2009) (Figure 4-1). 
 
 
Figure 4-1: Flow diagram from wellhead to test separator (Knudsen et al., 2006) 
 
4.1.3 Reasons for criticality of flow lines 
 
Corrosion is seen as one of the biggest problems for the assets in the Oil and Gas industry. Most of 
the leakages in machines are caused by corrosion. Today companies are using high grade steels such 
as duplex in order to lower or avoid the corrosion. But in a lot of cases this high investment is not 
done from the beginning or the composition of the crude changes over time. So corrosion is an 
ongoing battle for the operators in the Oil and Gas. Risk assessment at Statfjord field has shown 
corrosion in most of the flow lines because the flow lines are made of carbon steel, Figure 4-2. 
Pipeline and flow line material is selected with respect to potential corrosion and scaling due to CO2  
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Figure 4-2: Co2 Corrosion in pipeline (Source: merusoilandgas.com) 
 
and water production. The other important challenge in this subsystem is erosion. Production of 
sand creates disposal issues and several integrity challenges. Sand is erosive and may affect the 
functionality of valves and regularity equipment. To regulate the out pressure in the flow lines 
check valves are used and reducing the pressure leads to high speed and because of sand in the flow, 
erosion happens.  
In summery the consequence of failure and probability of failure in most of flowlines are high, so 
the system is most exposed to degradation and the risk factor is high, as the flow lines contains 
mixture of oil and gas.  
4.2 Production Subsystem 
 
The fluid which comes from the reservoir is a complex mixture of hydrocarbons uNDTr high 
pressure. In addition, the mixture condition, some contaminants such as water, sand and other 
solids. At high reservoir pressure is most of these hydrocarbons are in liquid form. This will 
however, change as the reservoir fluid is transported from the reservoir up to surface, and then 
through the process equipment to the storage tanks. During this process, the pressure decreases and 
some of the hydrocarbons will change from liquid to gas.  
The purpose of the crude oil separation process is to ensure  
 Controlled separation of gas and oil  
 The removal of water, sand and other contaminants  
The process thus ensures that the crude is free of gas and water and remains in as stable condition 
so that it can be stored and transported. The crude oil separation process on the Statfjord B has a 
capacity of approx. 250 000 barrels of oil and associated gas per day. The water content after 
separation should be no higher than 0.3% by weight. Evaporation pressure shall not be higher than 
10.5 and 11 psi (Oma and Birkeland, 2009) 
Oil and gas are separated into four steps as below and this study includes the first and second 
separators. 
 Step 1: inlet, CD2001  
 Step 2: Separator No. 1, CD2002  
 Step 3: Separator No. 2, CD2003  
 Step 4: Separator No.3, CD2004  
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The term "inlet" is only used to explain that this is closest to the well. This reservoir fluid passes 
through different stages. At each step, pressure is lowered (from 68 bars at Step 1 to 1.6 bars at step 
4). This means that we have separation, first by the light hydrocarbons and later of the heavier. The 
separated gas is transported on to the gas process. The inlet and separators No. 1 and 2 are three-
phase separators. They separate the oil, gas and water. Separator 3 is a two-phase separator, i.e., it 
separates the oil and gas. The water contained in the reservoir liquid is mostly removed in the inlet 
separator, and water accompanies the out gas removed in the gas process. Water that is still present 
in oil after separator No. 3 will normally be in the emulsion. This emulsion is then removed in 
separator 4. The separator is the almost water-free oil sent through a pre filter and through oil 
coolers and Crude oil filters to storage tanks in the bottom cells. Coolers reduce the crude oil 
temperature from 70 º C to 35 º C. This ensures that all readily volatile liquid condenses and makes 
crude oil so that it can be stored and transported safely. Cooling also helps prevent the buildup of 
tension in the storage tanks’ concrete walls. Crude oil filters remove the last remnants of the solids 
that had existed in crude oil (Oma and Birkeland, 2009). 
4.2.1 System Connection 
The sketch below shows the connection between the components of the crude oil separation system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.2 Description of process equipment 
4.2.2.1 The inlet separator  
 
The reservoir fluid flows through a container to reduce fluid flow rate and pressure to a level that 
enables to separate. The gas must be able to be separated from the liquid, and the oil and water must 
be given time to the separation because of difference in weight. This is called the setting time 
season. All Separators with different components are designed to regulate and increase the process 
efficiency. In order to this, it is possible to use small separators with minimal setting time. Separator 
area is a horizontal, rectangular tank with an available volume of 96 m3. This gives a setting time of 
about 5 minutes at a production of 240 000 barrels of fluid per day. Separator operates at a pressure 
of 59 bars (preferably reduced to 29 bars during LP operation) and a temperature of 82 º C. 
The reservoir fluid enters the separator through a cyclone unit. When the reservoir liquid 
enters into the separator the pressure and gas is released. The cyclone device consists of 8 cyclones 
and because of its design it is easier to release the gas. After passing the cyclone unit, gas and vapor 
in the upper part of the separator area is collected, while oil, water and solids are collected in the 
lower section. Overflow plates ensure that the water and the solids are separated from the oil by 
letting the oil pass over the plates to the end. Turbulence dampers are fitted at the gas and oil outlet. 
These dampers care to prevent turbulence and streamline the flow at the respective outlets. The 
Electric power  
Hydraulic System 
Jet water/ Seawater System 
Chemicals 
Crude oil from the wellhead 
Fuel gas 
Ballast System 
 
Crude oil -separation 
Fuel gas system 
Gas  
Re-compressive system 
System for produced water 
Crude oil storage tanks 
PCDA (Process control & data 
acquisition) 
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turbulence dampeners consist of a section of fine mesh. Sand and other solids accumulate 
distinguish between the plates and must be removed periodically (Smith et al., 2002, Helgesen and 
Birkeland, 2009, Oma and Birkeland, 2009). 
For effective separation of the fluid there is an oil level divider between the oil and the water. In 
addition, the gas temperature is monitored and flow data for water and gas are measured in order to 
create a complete production report. Below a brief explanation of regulations, measurements and 
alarm functions associated with the inlet separator. The Chemicals are added to increase the 
separation in the inlet separator. One uses defoamer  ("Antifoam") to prevent foam build-up in the 
separator and emulsion breaker and also separation of oil and water is better  (by dividing) Figure 4-
3 illustrates the different outlets.  
 
Figure 4-3 Separator 
The pressure in the separator is monitored primarily by the pressure control loop that regulates the 
pressure valve. This is located in the outlet for the gas, so the pressure remains at 59 bars. In 
addition, the separator is protected by PSV (pressure safety valve) and EHV (Emergency hand 
valves) (Fauske, 2009).  
 
4.2.2.2 Separator No. 1, CD2002  
 
Separator No. 1 is almost equal to the inlet separator. It is a three-phase separator which separates 
oil, gas and water. The second stage separator is quite similar to the first stage HP separator. In 
addition to output from the first stage, it will also receive production from wells connected to the 
Low Pressure manifold. 
 Separator No. 1 pick up the 
 crude oil from the inlet separator CD2001 
 condensate main knock-out drum in fuel gas system, CD6001 
 crude oil from the test separator CD2014 
 crude oil from the low pressure manifolds 
 water / oil mixture from the hydro-cyclones for inlet 
 
Figure 4-4 illustrates the modification in the separator to handle increased volumes of water from 
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the low pressure manifold. 
 
Figure 4-4 Modifications in the CD2002 (Oma and Birkeland, 2009) 
 
Instrumentation and controls separator No. 1 which monitors and regulates the pressure, water and 
oil level and gas flow are similar to that used on the inlet separator. In addition, Tracerco profiles 
are installed as level and volume measures to improve reading. Profile performs direct density 
measurements in the process medium is present between a gamma-ray source and a detector wand 
in the tank, Figure 4-5. 
 
Figure 4-5: Tracerco profiles (Schröder and Kauer, 2004, Choi and Bomba, 2003) 
 
 
The device can measure the level of gas, foam, oil, emulsion, water and sand. Changes in process 
density measured directly. There is no need for temperature compensation. The radioactive source is 
low energy Am241 (Americium). The detectors are Geiger-Muller detectors. Sensor strips can be 
Developing Empirical Formula to Calculate Inspection Coverage                                                                              
 
 
 
 
47
pulled back during operations. In addition, the separator is protected by PSV and EHV according 
the API. 
 
4.2.3 Reasons for criticality of production lines 
 
Some of the reasons which make this subsystem more critical in comparison with the other ones are 
as fallow: 
1. The most important process lines are in this subsystem because the untreated product goes 
through these two vessels for the first time and there are a lot of process activities. 
2. The piping system on the Statfjord B is made carbon steel and duplex where as the 
proportion of corrosion-resistant materials are increasing. The lines are also un-isolated. So, 
use of carbon steel leads to additional degradation mechanisms. 
3. The system is exposed between a high-pressure and low pressure production system and 
subsequently the volume increases. 
4. There is high range of consequences in case of failure in this equipment group 
5. Because of high temperature there is danger of solid particle in the well flow. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Developing Empirical Formula to Calculate Inspection Coverage                                                                              
 
 
 
 
48
5 Inspection analysis  
5.1 Inspection Data 
 
Carrying out physical inspection is the basis for the Inspection Program development. Inspection 
results are a part of the data to verify the technical condition of the equipment. The inspection 
Program is established for each loop corrosion / product code / system on each platform. A specific 
inspection program would appear from the approved annual plans for each platform. Statfjord 
produces from two main reservoirs, Statfjord and Brent. In the beginning of the project, the 
reservoir pressure ranged from 300 to 330 bars but this would be reduced down to 80-90 bars. The 
Statfjord field reservoirs are poorly to extremely compacted and some sand production has been 
observed during the production history (Høvring et al., 2009). 
An inspection program consists of two parts:  
 
i. The inspection program is recorded in the RIS (inspection database) for the platforms. 
ii. An inspection Program in hard copy for use offshore in the performance of the inspections. 
Data concerning the inspection method and calibration should be recorded in the report, together 
with inspector and qualification level. Findings for each equipment items should be entered into the 
inspection management database. These data includes: 
 
• Inspection data in RIS (SAP). 
• Finding Reports. 
• Status reports. 
• Technical Reports on the state 
Inspection data evaluation should include as a minimum: 
— Assessment of inspection findings 
— Estimation of existing minimum wall thickness 
— Estimation of corrosion rate 
— Remnant life calculations 
— Maximum acceptable Working Pressure  
— Establishment of retiring thickness 
— Conclusions on integrity status 
— Recommendations as to further action. 
The overall evaluation of the integrity status as a result of the inspection activity should be carried 
out and the findings of inspection, including the evaluations, shall be confirmed. 
(www.akerSolutions.com) 
 
5.2 Flow lines’ inspection methods 
 
Radiographic testing ( RK), Radiographic contact method (RKT), Ultra sonic (UL) and visual 
inspection ( VISN) are four types of inspection methods which are used on the Statfjord B. Figure 
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5-1 illustrates the percentage of each method in selected sub systems. Visual Inspection represents 
the highest percentage of inspection methods for the production flow lines on Statfjord B. The lines 
between 0-8 inches are inspected by the RKT method and for lines between 10-20 inches the UL 
method is usually utilized.  
The visual inspection is taking into account the eye's limitations. Under good lighting, an eye 
without aids see a circle a diameter of about 0.25 mm and a line of approx. 0025 mm wide. The 
normal eye cannot focus on a subject that is closer than 150 - 250mm. The purpose of visual 
inspection is to determine the condition of systems, parts of systems, components, parts, joints or 
other parts of the installations (PEM, 2010). Figure 5-2 illustrates how many percentages of each 
production flow line (16 out of 42) are inspected with each of method during 1994 till 2011.  
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
RK RKT UL VISN
Inspection Method
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
%
 
Figure 5-1: Indication of different types of inspection method during 1994-2011 on Statfjord B 
(AkerSolutions database) 
 
Developing Empirical Formula to Calculate Inspection Coverage                                                                              
 
 
 
 
50
0,00 %
5,00 %
10,00 %
15,00 %
20,00 %
25,00 %
30,00 %
35,00 %
40,00 %
45,00 %
50,00 %
HI PA RK RKT UL VID VISG VISN
Inspection method
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 Figure 5-2: Indication of different types of inspection method during 1994-2011 in production flow 
lines (AkerSolutions database) 
 
5.3 Flow lines’ Monitoring  
 
The results of monitoring carried out are used as the basis for the preparation of annual program / 
detailed program and / or other necessary corrective or compensatory measures safeguarding the 
technical condition. For example, the erosion rate is shown in Figure 5-3. 
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Figure 5-3: Erosion rate for different wells on Statfjord B (AkerSolutions database) 
 
5.4 COF and POF of Flow lines 
 
In order to analyse how critical a given functional failure is, it is necessary to carry out evaluation 
of probability and evaluation of consequences. Risk evaluation is based on the decision-making 
matrix illustrated in chapter 2.   
The flow lines go through the manifolds M04 and M06. The probability of CO2 corrosion and the 
consequence of failure are diverse from high to very high in most of the flow lines and this leads to 
risk level between medium to high. Sometimes, there is sand production in the wells and because of 
the high flow velocity the line and also some of the flanges are corroded, so they may change the 
material from CS to duplex. The velocity limit is 10 m/s and Figure 5-4 shows the velocity rate for   
different wells. The possibility of erosion is high in some flow lines because of the high sand rate. 
Figure 5-5 illustrates the sand rates in the B-29 wells during 12 months which has high erosion rate 
based on the Figure 5-2. 
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Figure 5-4: Flow velocity for different wells on Statfjord B (AkerSolutions database) 
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Figure 5-5: Sand rate for different well B-29 on Statfjord B (AkerSolutions database) 
 
 
 
 
5.5  Production lines’ inspection method 
 
These two separators CD2002 and CD2003 separate the oil and gas and also water contained in the 
reservoir liquid is mostly removed in the inlet separator. These groups are illustrated in Table 5-1. 
Table 5-1: Equipment groups of production lines 
Process hydrocarbons 
Two-phase 
 
Process hydrocarbons
Liquid 
 
Process hydrocarbons 
Vapours 
Produced 
Water 
20-PT-01 20-PL-01 20-PV-01 20-WP-02 
20-PT-04 20-PL-02 20-PV-02 20-WP-03 
 20-PL-03 20-PV-03 20-WP-05 
 60-PL-01  20-WP-06 
. 
Figure 5-6 shows how many percentages of each line are inspected with each of method during 
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1994 till 2011. So, 20-PT-01 is inspected more than the others because it is two-phase line and 
comes from production header. 
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Figure 5-6: Percentage of group the equipments in the separation subsystem for each inspection 
method during 1994-2011 on Statfjord B 
 
5.6 COF and POF of Production lines 
 
In order to analyse how critical a given functional failure is, it is necessary to carry out 
evaluation of probability and evaluation of consequences. The risk evaluation is based on the 
decision-making matrix illustrated in chapter 2. This evaluation has been done by the RBI and 
the results for the 20-PL equipment groups are as below in Table 5-2: 
Table 5-2: RBI data for 20-PL 
Equipment group Start Stop POF COF Risk Level 
20-PL-01 
CD-2001 
 (inlet separator) 
CD2002 
 ( crude flash 
drum no1) 
Very low Very high 
Medium
to 
High 
20-PL-02 
CD-2001 
 (inlet separator) 
CD2002 
 ( crude flash 
drum no1) 
Very low Very high High 
20-PL-03 
CD2002 
 ( crude flash 
drum no1) 
CD2003 
 ( crude flash 
drum no2) 
Very high Very high High  
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Based on these information, we can conclude that this subsystem is critical because the high 
consequence of probability. 
 
5.7 Material 
 
Type of material is one of the main parameters that can avoid the degradation of a component can 
take place. Table 5-3 (DNV, 2010) shows the components of the different materials. 
 
Table5-3: Definition of material (DNV, 2010) 
 
 
Most of the lines are carbon steel in this subsystem. But a portion of the stainless steel tubes have 
replaced the former carbon steel because of corrosion problems on many of these. One cannot 
exclude the possibility that the previously observed corrosion can have been caused by erosion, and 
could also be a problem in high risk areas for stainless steel tubes. Basically, says the strategy for 
sand control that the flow will be operated at speeds below 8 m / s and above there is danger of 
erosion problems. If at any time there have been recorded speeds above 8 m / s, one shall check 
whether there has been sand production in this period and the probability of erosion shall be 
reconsidered. In order to control any development in erosion problems, it is recommended that 
baseline measurements potential be carried out for erosion-prone areas. Degradation mechanism 
usually happened in two critical focus areas: 
 Drainage points Figure 5-7 which have a corrosive environment  and always liquid (oil, gas, 
water) is going down from the lines 
 Low point which stop liquid from running away because of the gravity. This may result in 
dead points and lead to a corrosive environment and sometimes if those remain silent for 
long time macro bacterial corrosion happens. 
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Figure 5-7: Drainage points (AkerSolutions database) 
 
5.8 Corrosion allowance 
 
Selection of suitable piping materials to resist deterioration in service is required to provide a safe 
piping design. A corrosion/erosion allowance will need to be determined to provide the required 
wall thickness. The corrosion allowance shall be specified by ASME B31.3 (ASME, 2008, Choi and 
Bomba, 2003). 
 
Points: 
 
 Different pressure classes have different corrosion allowance for example for non-hazardous 
areas it’s around 1.5 millimetres and for the pipes which come from wells, it is around 4.5 
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millimetres. 
 Pressure has influence on the class specification of pipeline and higher pressure leads to 
more severity and increase the margins of corrosion allowance. 
 
 
Figure 5-8 Erosion in chock valve (AkerSolutions database) 
 
Figure 5-8 shows a duplex choke valve and the typical erosion is clear inside of the choke valve.  
Corrosion in carbon steel pipeline is shown in Figure 5-9. 
 
 
Figure 5-9: Corrosion in carbon steel pipeline (AkerSolutions database) 
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An example: 
 
T nominal: 7 mm 
Tmin3: 0.6 mm 
Tmin2: 3.4 mm 
Tmin1:4 mm 
Corrosion allowance: 3 mm 
In this case, when the thickness is between 7-4 millimetres the inspection planner is not worry but 
when corrosion increases, so, thickness between 4-3 millimetres the inspection should be began 
more often. 
5.9 Wall thickness  
 
In the "RIS" four levels of wall thickness of a pipe are defined:  
T nominal: Pipe wall thickness and dimension according to pipe classification/ specification 
Tmin1: Pipe wall thickness which equals to pipe classification minus pipe corrosion allowance 
Tmin2: Minimum wall thickness of pipes according to requirements of ASME B31.3, with pipe 
classification according to design pressure and temperature, plus additional corrosion. 
Tmin3: Minimum wall thickness of pipes according to requirements of ASME B31.3, with pipe 
classification design pressure and temperature (ASME, 2008, Markeset and Ratnayake, 2010).  
 
 
Figure 5-10 Wall thickness Criteria (AkerSolutions database) 
 
Figure 5-10 illustrates different definition of wall thickness. Sometimes the Tmin2 is less than Tmin1 
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and it depends on the T nominal and corrosion allowance. For instance, T nominal: 15, Tmin3: 5, Tmin2: 8, 
Tmin1:12 and Corrosion allowance: 3. so, the Tmin2 is less than Tmin1. 
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Figure 5-11: Corrosion rate for 20-PL-02 
TT vs Corrosion rate
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Figure 5-12: Technical thickness vs. Corrosion rate for 20-PL-02 from 2000-2011 
 
Figure 5-11 shows Corrosion rate increase between 2009 and 2010. The reason is that in 
previous years they didn’t use the RBI and the inspection coverage was less in the past  but from 
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2009 the client start to use the RBI and the number of inspection have been increased, so they 
have a higher finding rate because they inspected more equipment groups in compare ion with 
previous years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Developing Empirical Formula to Calculate Inspection Coverage                                                                              
 
 
 
 
61
6 Most Important factors in Inspection Coverage  
6.1 Finding Rate 
 
 
Inspection findings can be reviewed to determine where future inspections should be focused. The 
overall evaluation of integrity status as a result of inspection activity should be carried out and the 
findings of inspection, including the evaluations shall be verified. Findings for each equipment item 
should be entered into the inspection management database (Markeset and Ratnayake, 2010). The 
finding rate is calculated based on the technical condition (TC). 
Figure 6-1 shows that the technical condition is divided into five parts based on the thickness: 
1. =0% (Because of corrosion, the minimum wall thickness of pipe remains, so, it is the 
critical condition for the pipeline.) 
2. 0%<TC<40% 
3. 40%<TC<70% 
4. 70%<TC<100% 
5. TC<100%.  (This is the best situation of the pipe.) 
 
 
 
Figure 6-1: Technical condition of pipe based on the wall thickness 
 
Based on data from 2000 to 2011, the number of inspection finding and also the number of 
inspection recommended are available, so the finding rate can be calculated by formula 6-1: 
 
 sinspection ofNumber 
100%in  findings ofNumber rate Finding 
  
(6-1) 
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Following criteria should be noted: 
Corrosion pit depth exceeding 80% of the wall thickness (T nominal): This criterion was 
developed to consider rupture of a part of corroded pipe. The section must be repaired or replaced if 
corrosion exceeds 80% of the wall thickness. 
Corrosion pit depth less than 12.5% of the wall thickness (T nominal): There is no limited to the 
length of corrosion when all of the measured pit depths are less than 12.5% of the wall thickness. 
Because the minimum wall thickness requirement for the same grade of API line pipe would be 
expected to determine (Choi and Bomba, 2003). 
 
Experiences have shown that the optimal finding rate for planned inspection plan is between 20-
25%. Inspection area is recognized based on the corrosion rate and the worst cases (highest speed in 
reducing TC) have highest priority. Sometimes the overall result of corrosion rate are same during 
several years but we cannot predict future, so some of the points which are not inspected should be 
included in the next plan because maybe they were corroded in future.  
 
 
An example can briefly show the meaning of inspection volume and finding rate: 
Total points for inspection are 100. The finding rate is 50%. So, these points should be inspected 
every 2 years based on the inspection plan and the remaining locations which are not critical now, 
should be inspected every 4 years. Based on this schedule, 37 locations should be inspected each 
year. To reduce the inspection volume,   planned should be reduced, so in the next step, influence of 
the coverage rate on the finding rate will be discussed. The coverage rate shows the number of 
locations which are in the system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2 Coverage rate 
 
 The Figures 6-5 and 6-6 show that the finding rate is between 15-20% for PT-20 and PL-20. So, the 
analysis will repeat again based on the coverage rate because it would more clearly by using the 
percentage. Formula 6-2 shows how we can find out the coverage rate: 
 
 (6-2) 
 
 locations ofNumber 
 sinspection ofNumber rate Coverage 
 
 
 
Table 6-6 shows the calculation for the coverage rate and Figure 6-8 illustrates the results of 
analysis. In order, to be sure about the inspection planning, the analysis has been done for the other 
subsystems 
100  
locations 
50
Serious
Not serious
50
Every 2 years 
Every 4 years 
25 locations for each year 
12 locations for each year 
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6.3 Technical Condition  
 
Inspection finding shall be categorized with finding code. For internal corrosion, the residual 
thickness less than the minimum acceptable thickness in accordance with relevant standards such as 
ASME B31G and API is dead point which means that equipment cannot be operated and must be 
taken out of service. On the other hand there could be serious failure development which is 
categorized by client as below. Figure 6-2 indicates the walls flow lines from front view. 
 
 
Pipe Diameter (D) 
Remaining Wall thickness (Tmål) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Otherwise: 
 
 TC (%) =
min3nomina 
min3mål
 T -T
 T - T  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-2: Flow line wall thickness 
 
 
D<8 mm and Tmål <2 mm 
 
D>=8 mm and Tmål <3 mm 
 
Tmål < Tmin3 
TC=0    
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6.4 Analysis of finding rate 
 
Inadequate inspection and maintenance schedules can lead to unacceptably low safety levels for the 
public, environmental damage, and monetary losses. Therefore, it is desirable that optimal or 
adequate inspection schedules are selected. On the other hand, inspection volume should be 
balanced with inspection finding rate. Figure 6-3 shows the schematics for inspection, condition 
assessment, and failure risk evaluation of pipes. 
 
 
 
Figure 6-3: Inspection and condition assessment for pipes (Rajani, 2004) 
 
 
 
Figure 6-4 illustrates the data which are got from the RIS data base. The analysis focus is inspection 
data from 2000 to 2011. The following steps have been done for this evaluation. 
1. Select the equipment group for example 20-PL-01 
2. Counting the inspection volume in different years from 2000 to 2011.  
3. Counting the number of tag numbers with less than 100% wall thickness from 2000 to 2011. 
4. Calculate the finding rate by formula 6-1 
5. Create curve based on the inspection volume vs. finding rate 
6. Repeat these steps for other equipment groups 
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Figure 6-4: Inspection analysis for flow lines (AkerSolutions database) 
 
 Green: Inspected more than one  ( in the interval) 
 White: Inspected just once 
 Red: High corrosion rate (Critical) 
 Purple: Under the minimal wall thickness  (more than critical) 
 
6.4.1 Flow lines 
The analysis has been done for 16 flow lines among 42. First the inspection volume is calculated 
based on the formula 6-1 and then the coverage rate is calculated by using formula 6-2. The results 
for each flow lines are presented in the Table 6-4. 
 
6.4.2 Separations 
 
Table 6-4 is results from the following steps. The total number of inspection volume and finding 
rate is calculated and Figures 6-5 and 6-9 illustrate the results. 
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Table 6-4: Calculation of coverage rate for production lines: 
10-B01-W1 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Inspection v 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Coverage rate 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 %
                        
10-B03-PT 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Inspection v 23 18 18 19 47 49 59 68 47 75 80
Coverage rate 3,67 % 2,88 % 2,88 % 3,04 % 7,59 % 7,92 % 10,02 % 14,62 % 10,11 % 16,13 % 17,20 %
                        
10-B11-PT 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Inspection v 76 84 69 111 92 114 113 89 1 37 16
Coverage rate 7,47 % 8,27 % 6,93 % 11,16 % 9,42 % 19,39 % 11,76 % 9,26 % 0,13 % 4,98 % 2,15 %
                        
10-B12-PT 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Inspection v 74 107 79 120 97 151 121 130 104 151 168
Coverage rate 16,30 % 24,32 % 17,95 % 27,27 % 22,15 % 24,75 % 28,81 % 30,95 % 24,76 % 35,95 % 40,00 %
                        
10-B13-PT 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Inspection v 89 87 92 97 128 84 101 154 155 154 165
Coverage rate 15,51 % 15,16 % 16,03 % 17,20 % 25,75 % 15,64 % 21,13 % 32,22 % 32,43 % 33,19 % 38,11 %
                        
10-B15-PT 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Inspection v 71 83 66 82 127 175 180 96 161 181 263
Coverage rate 14,00 % 16,37 % 13,02 % 16,33 % 25,76 % 28,69 % 36,51 % 19,47 % 32,66 % 36,71 % 56,32 %
                        
10-B17-PT 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Inspection v 22 20 13 0 104 36 40 96 14 94 91
Coverage rate 3,27 % 3,00 % 1,96 % 0,00 % 24,82 % 9,76 % 9,66 % 23,19 % 3,38 % 23,15 % 22,41 %
                        
10-B23-PT 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Inspection v 75 113 100 147 110 136 132 120 116 197 198
Coverage rate 13,79 % 21,00 % 18,59 % 27,58 % 21,24 % 26,25 % 25,48 % 23,17 % 22,39 % 38,03 % 38,22 %
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10-B24-PT 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Inspection v 76 57 60 147 70 93 132 177 61 165 147
Coverage rate 12,99 % 9,74 % 10,26 % 25,13 % 11,97 % 15,90 % 26,83 % 35,98 % 12,40 % 35,95 % 32,03 %
10-B27-PT 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Inspection v 63 105 66 115 65 134 86 137 108 177 168
Coverage rate 9,91 % 16,51 % 10,38 % 18,14 % 10,48 % 21,61 % 16,01 % 25,95 % 20,81 % 34,10 % 32,37 %
                        
10-B29-PT 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Inspection v 71 71 52 90 115 168 77 263 51 169 172
Coverage rate 12,43 % 12,43 % 9,11 % 15,76 % 22,86 % 33,40 % 15,31 % 52,29 % 10,14 % 33,60 % 34,19 %
                        
10-B33-PT 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Inspection v 71 71 52 90 115 168 77 263 51 169 172
Coverage rate 7,45 % 8,14 % 5,96 % 11,76 % 15,54 % 23,08 % 11,27 % 38,51 % 7,97 % 26,41 % 27,13 %
                        
10-B35-PT 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Inspection v 20 59 28 97 44 99 77 89 102 93 151
Coverage rate 3,13 % 9,22 % 4,38 % 15,16 % 6,97 % 16,45 % 15,01 % 17,69 % 20,28 % 18,49 % 30,38 %
                        
10-B37-PT 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Inspection v 61 86 68 136 92 127 196 131 129 191 168
Coverage rate 9,84 % 13,87 % 10,97 % 21,94 % 17,56 % 24,24 % 39,52 % 26,41 % 26,01 % 38,66 % 34,01 %
                        
10-B38-PT 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Inspection v 20 64 37 58 13 52 34 100 118 112 109
Coverage rate 7,49 % 24,52 % 14,18 % 22,22 % 4,98 % 19,92 % 13,03 % 71,94 % 84,89 % 80,58 % 78,42 %
                        
10-B40-PT 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Inspection v 53 65 63 87 97 118 124 155 52 121 148
Coverage rate 6,11 % 7,65 % 7,41 % 10,24 % 12,29 % 14,96 % 15,72 % 21,35 % 7,16 % 16,90 % 20,67 %
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Table 6-5: Calculation of finding rate for production lines 
EG 20-PL-01 20-PL-02 20-PL-03 20-PT-01 20-PT-04 
Year Inspection Volume 
 
Finding 
rate 
% 
Inspection 
Volume 
Finding 
rate 
% 
Inspection 
Volume 
Finding 
rate 
% 
Inspection 
Volume 
Finding 
rate 
% 
Inspection 
Volume 
Finding 
rate 
% 
2000 29 6,90 1 0,00 39 20,51 280 28,57 0 0,00 
2001 10 20,00 48 6,25 23 52,17 331 22,96 0 0,00 
2002 14 14,29 30 6,67 47 2,13 548 22,99 0 0,00 
2003 26 3,85 13 0,00 21 0,00 408 20,59 0 0,00 
2004 39 7,69 15 0,00 20 0,00 562 23,67 0 0,00 
2005 17 5,88 12 0,00 32 9,38 358 17,32 1 0,00 
2006 27 3,70 6 0,00 28 7,14 686 24,49 1 0,00 
2007 11 18,18 10 0,00 19 5,26 361 23,82 4 0,00 
2008 63 3,17 49 16,33 64 3,13 566 19,96 9 0,00 
2009 13 0,00 21 14,29 15 6,67 517 18,38 22 0,00 
2010 2 0,00 10 0,00 12 0,00 143 24,48 0 0,00 
2011 29 6,90 1 0,00 39 20,51 280 28,57 0 0,00 
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Table 6-6: Calculation of inspection coverage for production lines 
Table 6-7: Finding rate vs. Coverage rate 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Active 
H 79 143 61 145 525 417 181 235 168 2 264 76  
 
20-PT-01 
 Active             5750 
Total Del nr  8459 8316 8255 8110 7585 7168 6987 6752 6584 6582 6318 6242  
Inspection v  280 331 310 548 408 562 358 686 361 566 517   
Coverage 
rate  3,31 % 3,98 % 3,76 % 6,76 % 5,38 % 7,84 % 5,12 % 10,16 % 5,48 % 8,60 % 8,18 %   
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Active 
H 0 0 0 0 0 1 9 2 1 0 0 0  
 
20-PT-04 
 Active             730 
Total Del nr  8538 8538 8538 8538 8538 8537 8528 8526 8525 8525 730 730  
Inspection v  0 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 9 22 0 0  
Coverage 
rate 
 
 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,01 % 0,01 % 0,05 % 0,11 % 0,26 % 0,00 % 0,00 %  
20-PL
Finding rate 6.9 20,00 3,85 5,88 3,17 0,00 0,00 6,25 0,00 0,00 16,33 14,29 20,51 52,17 0,00 9,38 3,13 6,67 
Coverage 
rate% 7,34 2,54 3,95 4,80 17,80 3,69 0,25 12,12 3,76 3,52 15,51 6,65 10,03 6,08 5,56 8,47 17,83 4,18 20-PT
Finding 
Rate% 28,57 22,96 22,90 22,99 20,59 23,67 17,32 24,49 23,82 19,96 18,38 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Coverage 
Rate% 3,51 4,23 3,99 7,19 5,57 8,42 5,51 10,96 5,93 9,29 8,87 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,11 0,26 0,00 
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Figure 6-5: Inspection Volume vs. finding rate the flow lines (wells) 
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Figure 6-6: Inspection Volume vs. Finding rate in 20-PT 
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 Figure 6-7: Coverage Rate vs. Finding rate in 20-PL 
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Figure 6-8: Inspection Volume vs. Finding rate in 20-PL 
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Figure 6-9: Coverage Rate vs. Finding rate in 20-PT 
 
 
 
6.5 Summary of selecting critical sub­system 
 
The overall evaluation of integrity status as a result of inspection activity should be carried out and 
the findings of inspection, including the evaluations shall be verified. Inspection finding shall be 
categorized with finding code. For internal corrosion, the residual thickness less than the minimum 
acceptable thickness in accordance with relevant standards such as ASME B31G and API is dead 
point which means that equipment cannot be operated and must be taken out of service. Findings 
rate is calculated founded on the technical condition (TC) and based on the number of inspection 
finding and also the number of inspection recommended are available, the finding rate can be 
calculated. Moreover, the coverage rate also is calculated based on the number of inspection and 
total number of points. In this chapter, this analysis has been done for the flowlines and production 
lines. The result shows that the finding rate is almost between 15-20%. This rate is the value that the 
inspection engineer expects to have; with minimal coverage around 15-20% finding rate. 
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7 Effect of cost 
 
An effective inspection program is centred on knowing when, where and how to inspect. This enables the 
operator not only to control the integrity of the assets, but to control it with a focus on the economic value. In 
addition, having a documented trail for the inspection process allows for a focused and confident inspection 
plan updating should the operator undertake changes in operations, equipment, structures, personnel, 
contractors, company organization, etc. An Increase in inspection activities is thought to result in a safer 
installation, amid an increase in cost. 
 
Risk-Based Inspection (RBI) focuses on the optimization of the inspection programs. RBI begins with the 
recognition that the essential goal of inspection is to prevent incidents that reduce the safety and reliability of 
the operating facilities. As a risk-based approach, RBI provides an excellent means to evaluate the 
consequences and likelihood of component failure from specific degradation mechanisms and develop an 
inspection approaches that will effectively reduce the associated risk of failure. 
 
In practice, the RBI approach could be termed wholly qualitative (without use of any analytical tools) or 
wholly quantitative (without use of judgment) Almost all approaches are “semi-quantitative”, which are 
discussed in the previous chapters. This combined methodology can often provide for the most approving 
and practical results for risk ranking and optimize the time expected on the assessment (ABS, 2003) ( Figure 
7-1). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-1: Level of RBI analysis based on the cost (ABS, 2003) 
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7.1 Influence of cost parameters  
 
In order to understand the aspects influencing the costs of inspection and repair the following is 
implemented: 
 
 Understanding the distribution of damage through a system 
 Estimating corrosion rates 
 Estimating minimum remaining thickness of lines 
 Estimating the coverage rate 
 Number of findings and inspection volume 
 
 
Equally important is that the Design Engineers using the correct quality of data to produce design 
and develop the corresponding lifecycle strategies. Lack of information regarding fluid properties 
could lead to incorrect material selection, which in turn could lead to premature failure and either a 
design out or increase in inspection costs. 
A typical inspection budget may include the following: 
 
 Internal Company cost of man-hours for inspection 
 Cost of training own staff 
 Cost for specialist services, contract labour, transportation and accommodation offshore 
 The costs of inspection and assessment staff from industry inspection services, visits of 
regulatory  (HSE) inspection and statutory bodies for examination of the installation 
condition and general overall costs including transportation and accommodation costs 
offshore for  service personnel. 
 
An increase in inspection activities is thought to result in a safer installation, amid an increase in 
cost. But, there may be some exceptions as below: 
 
 i) If failure of a component does not result in significant risk exposure, then any inspection activity 
for that component will result in additional costs without any risk reduction and further inspection 
may not be necessary. 
ii) The extra inspection could even cause a risk increase due to issues such as human error during 
inspection and damage to protective coatings. 
iii) Inspection activities that do not focus on the detection of the specific degradation mechanisms to 
which the component is subjected to will result in cost without benefit (ABS, 2003). 
 
7.2 Evaluation of inspection planning in terms of cost 
 
Table 7-1 presents a summary of the inspections results for Statfjord B from 2006 to 2010. The 
objective index T/insp shows number of hours which are used per inspection. Usually, depending on 
the inspection planner experience, it is around one hour and if something special happen in the 
system it may be reduced or increased. The Table shows that when the finding rate increases the 
man hour increases as well. Moreover, Figure 7-2 illustrates the total number of inspection during 5 
years on Statfjord B. RBI implementation and using RIS data base started from 2008 and the Figure 
briefly shows that the number of inspection is increased in 2009. Inspection plan has sinuses 
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behaviour during several years because different parts of the system have various inspection 
intervals based on the RBI. This means that some of the parts which are inspected one year will not 
be inspected till 6 months or one year or 3 years later. Therefore, the inspection coverage decreases 
in 2010.  
 
Table7-1: Inspection results for Statfjord B 
 
Year Finding OK Cancelled Re-inspection Finding rate 
Total 
inspection Man-hour T/insp 
2010 1988 9442 940 793 17 % 13163 16810 1,28 
2009 2162 12601 1173 294 15 % 16230 18979 1,17 
2008 1754 7914 449 512 18 % 10629 12799 1,20 
2007 2502 10116 1267 641 20 % 14526 14146 0,97 
2006 1557 7515 739 252 17 % 10063 12670 1,26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-2: Inspection coverage from 2006 to 2010 
 
7.3 Effect of RBI on Cost 
 
 
RBI implementation helps to obtain an accurate balance of man hour for inspection during life time 
of the project. One of the major benefits of RBI is elimination of unnecessary inspection by 
focusing on the Risk level of the items also reducing the critical items for inspection leads to 
reducing large number of inspections (Hashemi et al., 2008). When the degradation mechanism is 
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well understood, it is possible to use an approach when is it “worth spending the money”? When it 
comes to the cost of inspection, average values should be assumed initially, and if necessary, 
uncertainties can be included. Afterwards, it might become relevant to look at individual 
components in more detail (DNV, 2010). In other words, RBI helps to cost optimization; increased 
production availability; and safety. 
Risk based inspection is cost effective strategy that should be included in a planned maintenance 
routine, especially as offshore structures approach their end of life. In today’s environment where 
quality and cost are key points you need to choose the best solutions and most cost effective Test 
and Inspection equipment to meet your manufacturing needs. The maximum fault coverage rate or 
having maximum finding rate at the lowest cost and can be achieved by a number of different 
solutions. 
 
7.4 Summary of effect of cost 
 
 
The RBI strategy by using PoF and CoF helps to have focus on critical area and reduce risk of 
failure and optimize inspection coverage due to reducing the cost. In this chapter, the inspection 
coverage from 2008-2011 on Statfjord B are analysed which the RBI strategy and RIS data base has 
been utilized. Inspection plan has sinuses behaviour during several years because different parts of 
the system have various inspection interval based on the RBI. This means that some of the parts 
which are inspected this year will not be inspected till 6 months or one year or 3 years later. The 
man-hour increased by increasing the inspection coverage.
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8 Mathematical modelling 
 
Risk based inspection is used to manage the inspection program and effective risk based inspection 
programs leads to reduced level of risk. The risk based inspection methodology helps inspection 
resources to act with higher level of coverage on the high-risk items and with proper effort on lower 
risk equipment. The RBI methodology focus is on the equipment with high damage degradation by 
using the probability of failure and consequences of failure. 
 
Risk = F (COF, POF, Inspection data, Time)               Risk = Cs × Fs 
S= Scenario 
Cs= Consequences of scenario 
Fs= Failure frequency of scenario 
 
 
The framework for inspection optimization based on the RBI methodology is illustrated in Figure  
8-1 (Nessim et al., 2000): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 8-1: Framework for RBI  
Optimization 
 
 
Inspection optimization based on understanding of risk can lead to some of the following benefits: 
(a) eliminating unnecessary or inappropriate activities 
(b) reducing  inspection for low-risks items 
(c) using more effective inspection methods instead of infrequent inspections 
(d) reducing plant shut downs and minimizing unexpected shut downs due to failures (Hashemi 
et al., 2008) 
 
 
 
Divide system into sub- systems 
Ranks sub-systems according to 
risk level 
Determine optimal strategy for 
targeted sub-system 
Implement optimal actions in order 
of refined ranking 
Risk 
Ranking 
Inspection 
optimization 
Repeat for each 
targeted segment 
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8.1 Mathematical modelling (Empirical): 
 
Inspection coverage programs is depend on the critically of a system or components by using the 
RBI analysis. The inspection coverage can be affected by utilization of NDT methods better 
identification of the damage mechanisms, adjusting the inspection coverage and adjusting the 
inspection frequency or a combination of them. In the last decades RBI practices have 
supplemented the historical empirical approach. A well defined risk matrix provides support in the 
screening process and identifying the critical area (Brandt and Eerten, 2005, Wisch and McMaster, 
2009).The most important degradation on Statfjord platform is corrosion. Studies have shown that 
corrosion have been determined based on the wall thickness. So, Corrosion propagation can be 
modelled based on the wall thickness what it is named as technical condition (TC).  Technical 
condition status is used to obtain finding rate which can be number of finding of wall thickness in 
less than 100% during the inspection. On the other hand, coverage rate shows how much points are 
covered in inspection planning. Both of these two parameters, finding rate and coverage rate are 
related to the number of inspection (Hashemi et al., 2008). 
The main contributions of this research are the modelling, formulation, and inspection policies, so, first 
the inspection coverage is formulated and then the approach is developed by using parameters to 
find out the inspection coverage and it is based on the empirical approach. Figure 8-2 is a sample 
illustration of inspection interval versus inspection coverage during life time of the specific parts 
with two years inspection interval. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8-2: Inspection coverage vs. inspection interval 
Let as define: 
t Present time 
1tf Finding rate for t-1 
1tc Coverage rate for t-1 
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rmT Remaining life time 
iT Inspection interval based on RBI for each equipment group (i=1, 2, 3…n) 
totaltC 1 Total number of locations inspected by NDT methods in t-1 
cancelledtC 1 Some of the locations in each interval are cancelled  
 inspectedretC 1   Some of the locations are in TC<0%, so they need re-inspection program 
 
 
Figure 8-3: factors illustration 
X1: Number of failures ( if ) which is determined from last year inspections 
X2: )1( ii fac   
a: re-operational factor 
Ci : Number of inspection 
IC: Inspection coverage 
 
Figure 8-3 shows how we can divide inspection volume to find an empirical formula.  
 
Hence, the inspection coverage can be considered as follows: 
Among the number of locations which were inspected in the previous period, some of them failed, 
among these some of them are going to be inspected during the next period, based on their technical 
condition. kC are the number locations in each categories of TC.  (k=1, 2, and 3) that should be 
inspected: 
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1. 70%<TC<100% : 11 3/1 Cc   
2. 40%<TC<70% : 22 2/1 Cc   
3. 0%<TC<40% : 33 Cc   
Hence,  
 3
k
kk cC  
On the other hand, there are some locations which have no failure on them, so based on ft-1, we 
can find out how many of locations have not failed. Among these locations some of them should 
be inspected during the next period based on the factor “a” what will be set. Hence, 
  afCB tt   )1( 11  
 
In addition, we know that some of the locations for in each equipment groups have not been 
inspected yet, these locations are separated based on their inspection interval and also their 
remaining life time and among these numbers of locations which should be inspected during 
each period, some of them are inspected and this would be recognized based on the factor “b”. 
C= b
T
T
AC
i
rm
total
t 








1  
 
Notice that inspectedretC

1   are inspected in a separate re-inspect program. Finally, some of the 
locations are cancelled in each period and some of them should be re-inspected and these 
coverage rates should be reduced from total inspection coverage for next period. 
 
 inspectedretcancelledtt CCCBAIC   11                            
 
                                                       (8-1) 
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Optimization is a mathematical discipline that concerns the finding of minima and maxima of 
functions. To find two factors “a” and “b” re-presents this optimization. “a” and “b” reflects several 
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parameters which are determined by the inspection planner. He/She establishes these two factors 
“a” and “b” by some considerations which are discussed below: 
 Material: 
Material is the effective factor and one of the main reasons for some of the degradation such as 
corrosion. Table 8-1 describes inspection guidance of different types of material depends on the 
degradation mechanisms. In this formula, we assume that the material is CS but if the material 
will be changed to duplex or other types the factors helps us to reduce the inspection coverage. 
 
 
Table 8-1: Summery of some external degradation mechanisms (DNV, 2010) 
 
 Technical Condition  (TC): 
TC can be defined as a remaining wall thickness. Criteria for inspection are presented in Table 
8-2: 
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Table 8-2: Effect of TC on inspection interval 
 
TC Inspection interval 
0% Re-inspection program 
%0<TC<40% All of the points in Next year 
40%<TC<70% Half next year and the remain half in the other next year 
70%<TC<100% All of the points in every 3 years 
 
It is obvious that the other factors discussed factor may change the inspection coverage. For 
instance, half of the failures between 40 %< TC<70% should be inspected next year so factor “a” 
could be 2
1  
 Other types of inspection method 
In this formula, the total number of locations which are inspected by NDT are discussed, so, and 
some parts are also inspected by visual inspection.  
 Corrosion rate 
When the corrosion has progressed to the point where the minimum wall thickness has been 
reached the corrosion life is actually consumed; any associated defects become unacceptable, and 
the component needs repair or replacement. The effect of corrosion rate is appeared in the Technical 
condition (TC). 
 Criticality: 
RBI reports helps us to select the most critical areas and start the inspection plan based on the high 
risk ranking which are discussed in previous chapters. Depending on which type of product we have 
(water, gas and oil) the factor can be changed. 
 
8.1.1 Remaining life time criteria 
 
The rate of degradation increase in at the end of the expected lifetime. The degradation life cycle is 
an elegant measure to define stages in the life of a component, characterized by the level of damage 
that has developed, or is expected to have developed. It can be helpful to define certain regimes of 
inspection.  (Figure 8-4) 
The Design strategy set is based on the quality of data. In the case that the strategy is not followed, 
for example, lack of information properties could lead to incorrect material selection, which in turn 
could lead to premature failure and either through a wrong design or increase in inspection costs.  
Or the strategy is reviewed to ensure it is working the life of the installation.  In a reassessment, a 
new degradation model is introduced based on new technology and the design life exceed the 
design strategy set. The optimum life cycle is that, there are no defects after the design life is 
finished (Ancel and Ugboaja, 2008, NORSOK 2010). 
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Figure 8-4: Lifecycle of a typical asset(Ancel and Ugboaja, 2008) 
 
Assessment of the inspection interval for rate-based failure mechanisms shall be based on an 
estimate of the remaining life at the most recent inspection or at start-up of the equipment if no 
inspection has been carried out. Remaining life shall be calculated based on corrosion rate and 
difference between remaining wall thickness and minimum allowed wall thickness. The minimum 
allowed wall thickness which shall be used is the calculated thickness according to code 
requirements for pipes and pipelines, and nominal thickness minus corrosion allowance for vessels. 
Other criteria for determining remaining life can be used where suitable (Vandecamp et al., 2009).  
 
In formula 8-2, the remaining life time is used. Consider Figure 8-5, Corrosion rate for failure is 
measured and also the time of first detection is known. Also, we know the corrosion allowance and 
wall thickness, so, we can find the remaining life time. For instance: 
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Figure8-5: Corrosion rate vs. Time (Vandecamp et al., 2009) 
 
 
 The corrosion rate is: 1.5 mm/year 
 Detection time is after 2 years 
 Wall thickness is 8 mm 
 Corrosion allowance is 3 mm 
 
The assumed remaining life time can be calculated: 3.3
25.1
)25.18(2 
  year 
It means that the RL is around 3 years later. 
  
In Statoil procedure TR1987, a factor is defined based on the criticality of the system which can 
help to find out the remaining life time. In this case, the acceptance criteria used shall be taken from 
Table 8-3: 
 
 
 
Table 8-3: Interval as a function of remaining life (RL) and consequence classification (Fauske, 
2009) 
 
Consequence Inspection interval 
Extremely high 0.3 * RL 
Very high 0.3 * RL 
High 0.4 * RL 
Medium 0.5 * RL 
Low No inspection 
 
8.2 Validating the inspection empirical model based on past inspection data 
 
In this section, we will show the results of the proposed methodology for the Statfjord B inspection 
data. The optimum inspection model is a decision-support model. It presents inspection coverage as 
function of the time versus updated condition based on inspection result. Inspection engineer 
experience has direct influence on the optimum inspection model. The optimum inspection 
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coverage formula has been checked for two different flow lines, production and water drainage. By 
two parameters “a” and “b”, the optimum inspection is determined. In this evaluation, these two 
factors are calculated as blew: 
 
 The total number of failures in each categorization of TC is calculated.  For TC greater than 
70% , 1/3 of them are to be inspected, between 40% to 70%, half of them and between 0% 
to 40% all of them to be inspected and the sum of these creates α 1 
 In inspection summary, the percentage of the pipe material is declared, so, the percentage of 
CS is considered as α 2 
 In inspection summary, all of inspection are considered by using the NDT method and 
reduction factor α 3 can be selected to reduce  number of inspection in next year 
In summary for the two factors “a” and “b”,  
αa,b= α1×α2×α3 
 
 
The results of the analysis of the two case studies using the proposed methodology are discussed in 
the following sections (Khan et al., 2004) 
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Case study 1 (Production lines) 
 
Based on 2009 inspection data Table 8-4 illustrates the result and Figure 8-6 illustrates the results 
compares the result with the results of Client inspection planner for production lines 
 
 
Table 8-4: Optimum inspection coverage for 2010 based on Empirical Formula 8-2 
Equipment  
Group 
 
2009C
 
 
2009f  
totalC2009  
CancelledC2009
fallowupC2009  rm
T  
 (Year)
iT  
 (Year) 
a,b Risk level IV2010 
20-PL-01 49 0,02 274 0 1 20 6 0,27 M 32 
20-PL-02 40 0 252 0 0 11,5 8 0,24 VH 45 
20-PL-03 38 0,06 238 0 0 1,2 0,5 0,26 VH 33 
20-PL-04 33 0,11 196 1 0 5,5 0,5 0,32 VH 24 
20-PL-05 30 0,14 98 0 1 8 0,5 0,31 VH 19 
20-PL-06 36 0,14 347 1 0 1,6 0,5 0,28 VH 45 
20-PL-07 675 0,04 3828 57 1 26 8 0,28 VH 616 
20-PT-01 1255 0,14 6038 54 28 26 8 0,25 VH 938 
20-PT-02 258 0,24 1481 60 9 26 8 0,28 VH 189 
20-PT-04 10 0 730 0 0 26 8 0,0072 M 5 
30-PL-01 153 0,01 1060 1 0 14 6 0,24 M 178 
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Figure 8-6: Comparison of inspection Coverage and results of empirical formula and SFB 
inspection team finding for 2010 
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Case study 2 (Water drainage lines) 
 
Based on 2009 inspection Table 8-5 illustrates the result and Figure 8-7 compares the result with the 
result of Client inspection planner for water drainage lines. 
 
 
Table 6-5: Inspection coverage for 2010 based on Empirical Formula 8-2 
Equipment  
Group 
 
2009C
 
 
2009f  
totalC2009  
CancelledC2009
fallowupC2009  rm
T  
 (Year)
iT  
 (Year) 
a,b Risk level IV2010 
20-EC-01 33 0,27 306 3 1 12 6 0,377 M 61 
20-EC-02 26 0,04 78 0 0 16 8 0,21 M 18 
20-EC-03 14 0,07 52 0 0 5,7 8 0,25 VH 21 
20-EC-04 24 0,38 200 0 1 5,4 0,5 0,41 VH 23 
20-EC-05 21 0,29 142 0 2 4,3 2 0,3 VH 17 
20-EC-06 27 0,33 142 0 2 4,3 0,5 0,3 VH 17 
54-EC-01 853 0,32 7672 30 46 26 8 0,28 VH 983 
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Figure 8-7: Comparison of inspection Coverage and result of empirical formula and SFB inspection 
team finding for 2010 
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8.3 Summary of mathematical modelling 
 
The most significant degradation on Statfjord platform is Corrosion. Studies have shown the 
corrosion have been determined based on the wall thickness. Technical condition status is used to 
obtain finding rate which can illustrates number of finding in less than 100% of wall thickness in 
whole number of inspection. In this chapter, by using the inspection data base and the empirical 
approach a mathematical formula is found out to calculate inspection volume in each period. The 
formula is based on the inspection coverage at time t-1, finding rate at time t-1, time interval and 
remaining life time and also the two factors “a” and “b” presents this optimization of inspection 
coverage. “a” and “b” reflects several parameters which are determined by the inspection planner 
such as material, corrosion rate, TC. In this study, these two parameters are calculated the same, but 
it is obvious that they may change based on the inspection engineer experience. At the end of this 
chapter, the empirical formula is evaluated in two cases and the result compares with actual 
inspection which had been done in SFB. 
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9 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
 
Risk-based inspection approaches have been practiced by industry to determine probable failure 
mechanisms, their likelihood of occurrence and the associated consequences. Overall, the RBI is a 
methodology to improve the management of risk through closely focusing on the critical areas of 
the plant, and reducing efforts on the non-critical areas. The data are then used to determine 
inspection frequencies (Santos and Hajri, 2000). 
 
Planning inspections for process sub systems become more challenging if the system is built from many 
different diameters and thicknesses, and if it has developed a mature corrosion condition that requires 
regular replacement of sections of systems. Identifying inspection coverage by the correct view helps 
to cover high percentage of un-inspected points in the remaining life time of plants to reduce the 
shut down time and increase the productivity of the system and the inspection plan becomes more 
cost effective. In addition, inspection planner based on his/ her experience can select an accurate 
measure for factors to cover most of points in the early years of extension time rather than close to 
shut down deadline and this provide;  
 Increase in plant availability  
 Decrease in the number of failure occurrences  
 Reduction in the level of risk due to failure  
 Reduction in the direct inspection cost of the production and/or process facility 
 Cost effective scheduling of inspection man hour in each year 
 Reducing number of inspection in the years close to reaming life time 
 Evaluate current inspection plans to determine priorities for future inspections. 
 Evaluate future plans for decision making (Conley and Reynolds, 1997) 
 
The thesis, suggest an empirical formula based on the available data and the experience of the 
inspection engineers in SFB. Although, the result of formula and the SFB inspection team are close, 
in some of the cases there are some differences. It is obvious two factors “a” and “b” has significant 
effect on inspection coverage. In this study we calculate these two factors based on the 3 items 
(Material, TC and NDT), but further studies can develop the formula by using other important 
factors such as corrosion rate. The inspection engineer based on her/his experiences can change the 
factors because the inspection plan is really condition –based and some unexpected event may 
change everything. This formula let the inspection engineer to consider every situation or condition 
by changing the factors (Vandecamp et al., 2009) .  
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11 Appendix 
